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Advancing technology and the changing nature and tempo of modern
warfare has created many challenges. Desert Storm reiterated the need for
Near-Real Time (NRT) imagery of the battlefield. History shows that
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) have the capability to meet some of these
challenges. The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) is directing
a program to develop a family of UAVs that will meet the future NRT
imagery needs of operational commanders. The High Altitude Endurance
(HAE) UAV is p.\rt of this family of UAVs that will serve to provide
sustained, broad area coverage for those commanders with time critical
needs.
The thrust of this thesis is to define a process by which the time-
critical Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) imagery
needs of the tactical commander on the battlefield can be met through
effective dynamic retasking of the HAE UAV. This thesis examines HAE
UAV capabilities, the intelligence cycle, and collection management
procedures. Prohibitors of timely intelligence are highlighted. A process is
described through which the HAE UAV may be dynamically retasked to meet
the ground force commander's real-time collection requirements. The
appropriateness of the HAE UAV to be used to satisfy the ground force
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As advancing technology continues to make possible the use of more and
more sophisticated weapons for the modern battlefield, changes in the art of war
are inevitable. One such change is the tempo at which battlefield engagements are
conducted. The desire to "get inside" of the enemy's decision loop has precipitated
the need to act faster and smarter during combat. With this need also comes the
need for real-time intelligence support to battlefield commanders. Desert Storm
served as a reminder that the current intelligence architecture is not equipped to
provide tactical commanders with real-time intelligence through the dynamic
retasking of collection assets. However, the dawning of more sophisticated
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology and the history of successful UAV use
during previous conflicts offers hope for meeting the real-time intelligence needs of
tactical commanders in the future.
This thesis reveals the successful use of UAVs throughout their short history
and discusses the capabilities of one developmental UAV in particular, the High
Altitude Endurance (HAE) UAV. The current intelligence system is also discussed
and the method by which army tactical commanders request intelligence within a
theater of operations is examined. These processes are examined in detail in order
to understand the current process through which tactical commanders request
intelligence on the battlefield. This examination offers insight into what problems
exist which prevent battlefield commanders from getting the intelligence they need
during time-critical situations. Time is also devoted to the discussion of what may
be considered prohibitors to timely intelligence. This thesis discusses the historical
emphasis on national collection at the expense of tactical collection, as well as
specific problems encountered during Operation Desert Storm which prevented
timely intelligence.
Once these ideas have been fully developed, a probable scenario is described
in which a tactical commander may require real-time intelligence support. It is
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important that the reader understand that the unpredictable nature of warfare
makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to describe the typical scenario; therefore,
a probable scenario will have to suffice. This scenario also serves to limit the scope
of the problem at hand by making certain assumptions.
Once the scenario is complete, it is used to facilitate the idea of how a new
intelligence process could be used to meet a real-time collection requirement. This
new process for dynamic retasking involves many entities. In order to maximize
the effectiveness of the dynamic retasking process, active participation by the JFC
(Joint Force Commander) and J-2 (Director of Intelligence) staff will be necessary.
Their involvement and support of dynamic collection requirements is essential to
support the timely fulfillment of such requirements. In addition, a standard
procedure must be in place that will facilitate the timely processing of real-time
collection requirements and that will ultimately connect the requester of collection
support to the actual collector operator. This thesis describes the anticipated
responsibilities of the JFC and J-2 as well as provides the structure and definition
for a new procedure that may facilitate the timely fulfillment of real-time
requirements given certain scenario assumptions.
The current process for collection could be altered in several ways to ensure
timely and effective tasking of collection assets. Instituting skip-echelon procedures
will reduce the time normally required for requests to travel through the chain-of-
command. Combining the functions of the J-2, JRC (Joint Reconnaissance Center),
and the JFACC (Joint Force Air Component Commander) into a single entity, called
the DRCMA (Dynamic Requirements Collection Management Authority), will
facilitate a more timely response to dynamic collection requests. The DRCMA will
also provide flexibility during combat by delineating tasking authority to meet the
JFC priorities with regard to timeliness and overall effectiveness. This delineation
of authority could be exercised through geographical or mission area divisions
within the DRCMA to increase timeliness and reduce the possibility of
bottlenecking. The timeliness of the DRCMA process also depends on the ability of
XVlll
requesters to select the most appropriate collector. The Joint Collection
Management Tool (JCMT) will support the requester's ability to make a wise
selection by providing a model of all the collection assets and information
concerning their respective capabilities and availability.
Finally, the long range and long loiter time capabilities of the HAE UAV are
balanced against their use for dynamic retasking to support the tactical
commander's time-sensitive intelligence requirements. A discussion follows that
explores the tradeoffs encountered by using the HAE UAV for such a purpose. The
HAE UAV's capabilities may be more appropriately used to fulfill deeper
reconnaissance and surveillance missions to support the JFC's theater objectives at
the expense of close range dynamic collection needs experienced by field
commanders. The HAE UAV combined with the DRCMA process may offer a quick
solution to a complex problem, but a more serious look and perhaps a rethinking of




Military planners realized early in World War I that pilotless aircraft
could have substantial advantages over the traditionally manned airplanes.
Research began at the Ordnance College of Woolwich after the British
sustained heavy pilot casualties as a result of the German Fokker. Professor
A.M. Low was tasked to design an unmanned aircraft capable of interception
and ground attack. Unfortunately, numerous mishaps hampered the British
attempt to demonstrate the effectiveness of unmanned aircraft. [Ref. 1: p. 21]
The United States (US) was also conducting experiments with
unmanned aircraft. The Navy's efforts led to the first successful flight of a
"robot" aircraft on March 6, 1918, when the Curtis flying bomb flew 1000
yards. The Curtis bomb was guided by a preset gyroscope for direction, and a
barometer controlled the altitude. Once the aircraft had flown the prescribed
distance, the engine would shut off and the bolts holding the wings in place
would be mechanically removed. The fuselage and the bomb would then fall
to the target. [Ref. 1: p. 22]
The Army explored the possibilities of unmanned flight in a program
that created a biplane called the Kettering Bug. Charles F. Kettering led this
first successful effort to deliver an explosive to a target with an unmanned
aircraft. The Kettering Bug, with a 15 foot wingspan and a 37-hp engine,
carried a 180 pound bomb. On its fourth flight, the Kettering Bug flew a
specified distance before the controls directed the airplane into a nose-dive
directly to the target. However, the war ended less than a month after this
flight, leaving little time to exploit its success. [Ref. 1: p. 22]
B. V-l BUZZ BOMB
The development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) continued
throughout World War II with the introduction of weapons of mass
destruction like the German made V-l Buzz Bomb. The V-l was guided by
an Askania gyroscope that gave it altitude and direction information. A
small propeller on the nose of the bomb measured the distance traveled.
Once the V-l traveled the preset distance, the fuel was automatically shut
off, allowing the bomb to make a "buzzing" nose dive towards the target
below. Even though only 2,500 out of 10,500 V-ls survived their own
mechanical failures and the British air defenses, they caused 14,665
casualties. Consequently, the V-l was one of the most notorious UAVs of
World War II. [Ref. 1: p. 27-28]
C. FIREBEE TO AQM-34
In 1951, Ryan Aeronautical Company produced the first jet engine
target drone called the Firebee shown in Figure 1-1. Nine years later, when
Gary Francis Powers was shot down in a U-2 during a reconnaissance
mission over the Soviet Union, the Firebee went from target drone to
reconnaissance asset. The political embarrassment caused by this incident
forced the US to cease further manned reconnaissance flights over the USSR
Figure 1-1. Firebee ground launch. From Ref.
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using the U-2. This led to a major reconfiguration of the Firebee into the
AQM-34 reconnaissance drone. The Teledyne-Ryan AQM-34 was first used
for photographic reconnaissance over China in 1964. In 1965, China downed
one of the pilotless aircraft. In the years that followed, improved drones were
introduced that could fly at higher altitudes and avoid enemy air defenses.
[Ref. 1: p. 30-31] This shift to unmanned aircraft allowed the US to continue
its critical reconnaissance missions without the political risk or loss of human
life.
D. "BUFFALO HUNTER" IN NORTH VIETNAM
High attrition rates of US aircraft during bombing missions in North
Vietnam led to major innovation in the technology and operational usage of
UAVs during an operation called Buffalo Hunter. A group of variants of the
original AQM-34 flew over 3,000 sorties with missions ranging from target
acquisition and damage assessment to electronic surveillance and jamming of
enemy radar. [Ref. 2: p. 1-2] Their speed, size, and low altitudes allowed
them to effectively avoid enemy defenses, giving the reconnaissance UAVs an
attrition rate of only 4% [Ref. 1: p. 31]. During Buffalo Hunter, unmanned
aircraft demonstrated their capabilities during an actual conflict.
E. UAVS FOR THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD
Fortunately, much development and demonstration of UAV
capabilities has already been done. UAV technology that has been maturing
since World War I was used extensively during the Israeli Operation Peace
for Galilee in the Bekaa Valley, and in Iraq and Kuwait during Operation
Desert Storm. In both of these operations, UAV technology proved itself in
incredible ways. UAVs showed that they were ready to support a variety of
different missions on the modern battlefield. Although many UAV
accomplishments during these wars were service-specific, the lessons learned
from their experience and use can be applied to all future joint operations.
As the military works to create a joint environment for all prospective
operations, UAV capabilities will be more appropriately employed to provide
benefits for all the services.
One of the major lessons learned from Desert Storm was that
intelligence collection assets were insufficient to meet the need [Ref. 3: p. 20].
John Deutch, Deputy Secretary of Defense, said that improvements were
needed in "intelligence for military commanders in the broadest sense,
whether you are talking about national assets or tactical reconnaissance [Ref.
4: p. 42]." After the war, operational commanders said that they were
skeptical of relying too much on satellites for reconnaissance, but there were
not many other good alternatives. General John Michael Loh, Air Combat
Command, said that the Air Force had not made progress in tactical
reconnaissance. When only eighteen RF-4Cs arrived just before the
beginning of the air war, it was clear that the Air Force had a low priority on
tactical reconnaissance assets [Ref. 5: p. 194-95]. Regardless, the need for
near real-time (NRT) tactical intelligence persisted. Admiral Stanley Arthur,
commander of the Seventh Naval Fleet and all US naval forces in Central
Command during the war, commented, "We found that everybody wanted to
know more about what was visually happening on the battlefield than we
had assets to do [Ref. 4: p. 42]." NRT imagery of the battlefield was needed
to support the commanders in the field, the Joint Force Commander (JFC),
and everyone in between.
1. Israeli use of UAVs
The concept of gathering NRT imagery of the battlefield was validated
during the Israeli conflict with Syria in 1982. Israeli-made Scouts, shown in
Figure 1-2, and Mastiffs were used in the initial air offensive into Syria.
While some of the UAVs were used to identify the Syrian Surface-to-Air
Missile (SAM) radar locations and signatures, others were used to transmit
live video of the air attack to the Israeli commander. Israeli Scouts were
fitted with TV cameras that provided the commander with live video of the
air campaign while he was watching from his ground-based command post.
[Ref. 6: p. 22-23] This was a brilliant example of UAVs providing the
necessary NRT imagery to support the mission. The US Navy also achieved
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Figure 1-2. Israeli Scout fitted with video
camera. From Ref. [1].
2. Pioneer in Desert Storm
The US Navy kept at least one Pioneer UAV, shown in Figure 1-3,
airborne at all times during Desert Storm [Ref. 7: p. 45]. During operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, a total of 523 missions were flown using the
Pioneer system, whose primary elements included five UAVs and a ground
control station (GCS). Pioneer was effective in accomplishing a variety of
missions including surveillance, targeting and gunfire adjustment, and
damage assessment. The video information collected by the Pioneer was
downlinked to the GCS in NRT. [Ref. 8: p. 4-5] Pioneer superbly
demonstrated the value of NRT imagery collection when its video image was
used to adjust naval firepower to accurately hit the target [Ref. 9].
In spite of these successes, Desert Storm served as a reminder that
NRT imagery is essential to the warfighters, and that the capability to
provide such imagery on a large scale is not yet a reality. Even though the
capability to meet the warfighter's NRT imagery needs were not fully
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realized during the Gulf War, we can be optimistic. History shows that
UAVs can provide NRT imagery, but the "intelligence machine" is not yet
equipped to provide this level of support to all the warfighters in joint
operations.
Figure 1-3. Pioneer prepares for launch during a
Desert Storm Operation. From Ref. [4].
F. UAVS FOR TOMORROW
The combination of budget constraints for the Department of Defense
(DoD), the continuing development of new and advancing UAV technology,
the obvious successes of UAVs in Desert Storm, and other factors have turned
many hopeful eyes towards UAVs. The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance
Office (DARO) is presently directing a development of UAVs for tomorrow's
battlefield that will support all of the services. This development effort
includes work done by the Joint Program Office (JPO) and the Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA). [Ref. 10: p. 1-1,6] The development effort
is focused on providing a family of UAVs to support the warfighters
intelligence needs, each UAV having unique capabilities.
The High Altitude Endurance (HAE) UAV is one of the members of
this family and is being managed by ARPA. One of ARPA's objectives is to
provide a solution to the problems addressed previously concerning NRT
imagery. The HAE UAV aims to support the warfighter's immediate imagery
needs through a process called dynamic retasking. Dynamic retasking is
defined as the process of altering the HAE UAVs mission plan in real time to
satisfy immediate requirements. The problem of getting imagery intelligence
to the warfighter in NRT is complex and will not be solved easily, but a
process that allows for the effective dynamic tasking of the HAE UAV will
certainly reduce the time between the warfighter's request for information
(RFI) and the final receipt of that information.
History shows that tactical commanders want NRT imagery to support
military operations on the battlefield. History also shows that UAVs have
the capability to provide NRT imagery under certain circumstances. This
thesis will examine the planned capabilities of the HAE UAV, the current
tasking process, problems within that tasking process, and then attempt to
describe a process through which tactical commanders may dynamically
retask the HAE UAV to satisfy their requirements for immediate imagery on
the battlefield.

II. THE HAE UAV SYSTEM
A. BACKGROUND
In November of 1993, the Congressional Authorization Conference
published a report that stated, "tactical reconnaissance is relatively more
important to national security than at any other time in our history" [Ref. 10].
The report also requested that a new approach be taken in the development
and acquisition of new tactical airborne reconnaissance systems that would
"bring management attention, order, and efficiency." Consequently, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense created the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance
Office (DARO) to unify current reconnaissance architectures and manage the
future acquisition of all joint service and Defense-wide airborne manned and
unmanned reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. [Ref. 10: p. ES-1]
Therein lies the great challenge that DARO must face: to develop standard
data formats and common tasking strategies for all the disparate systems
ranging from the U-2 and its unique tasking, processing, and dissemination
architectures to the smallest tactical UAV with its own non-developmental
item architectures, while insuring appropriate interfaces with national
collection systems to support the warfighter [Ref. 10: p. 1.7-8].
DARO published the Integrated Airborne Reconnaissance Strategy
(IARS) to provide visibility into the steps that must be taken to insure that
the necessary interfaces and integration become a reality. Figure 2-1 is a
visual depiction of IARS and how it will make use of new C4I technologies to
support the warfighters' capability to "see" deeper and "hear" more clearly
[Ref. 10: p.1-8]. The HAE UAV, shown as "Endurance UAV in Figure 2-1,
will be an integral part of this strategy. (The Tier II Plus and Tier III Minus
air vehicles are both part of the HAE UAV system, but for the purposes of
this thesis, only the Tier II Plus will be examined.) It will be used in
conjunction with other collectors such as joint and tactical manned
reconnaissance platforms as well as tactical UAVs. The IARS is to combine
and exploit these collector capabilities and provide the warfighters with the
information they need on the battlefield.
Figure 2-1. DARO's Integrated Airborne Reconnaissance Strategy.
FromRef. [11].
The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) is managing the HAE
UAV program under DARO's direction as an Advanced Concepts Technology
Demonstration (ACTD). This allows for an accelerated and streamlined
development of HAE UAV technology, and provides users with an
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understanding of the military utility of the technology before committing to
its acquisition. ACTDs are designed to reduce acquisition risks and allow the
user to develop Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) while deferring major
investment until the technology is mature enough to provide military utility.
[Ref. 10: p. 1-4]
The military utility that DARO plans to provide through the HAE
UAV is support to combat planning and battlefield execution through
extended tactical and theater reconnaissance. This will also be accomplished
by providing continuous, all weather, day or night, broad area
Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) in near-real-
time (NRT) to Joint Force Commanders. [Ref. 12: p. 1-1]
B. SYSTEM CAPABILITIES
The HAE UAV system is a multi-purpose, long dwell, broad area
theater reconnaissance and surveillance system that will provide
enhanced, end-to-end, interoperable, integrated intelligence support to
operational commanders [Ref. 12: p. 2-1].
It is designed to provide 24-hour continuous broad area coverage of
areas of interest within the entire theater of operations. It will be able to
provide RSTA and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) imagery of areas up to
3000 nautical miles from the base of operations. It will provide imagery with
the necessary geolocation accuracy and resolution in a timely manner to
operational commanders so as to support real-time combat planning and
execution. The air vehicle, shown in Figure 2-2, will employ its suite of
sensors, Synthetic Aperture Radar/Electro-Optical/Infra-Red (SAR/EO/IR), to
collect imagery of preplanned areas and send imagery directly to combat
commanders through line-of-site (LOS) or satellite communications
(SATCOM). These links will also support the dynamic retasking of the HAE
UAV to image new areas of interest in support of time-critical mission
priorities. [Ref. 12: p. 2-1]
n
Figure 2-2. Tier II Plus High Altitude Endurance
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. From Ref. [13].
The ability of the HAE UAV to loiter for 24 hours over a single area of
interest may give the theater Commander in Chief (CINC) tremendous
advantages over previous CINCs. According to John Entzminger, ARPA's
director for the HAE UAV program, the theater commander wanted
continuous coverage of the Iraqi Republican Guard during Desert Storm. He
wanted to know when and if they moved, but the capability was not
available. The HAE UAV system will be able to meet needs like this during
the next conflict. Its ability to loiter for long periods of time and to provide
continuous coverage of a 10-30 kilometer swath gives the HAE UAV
unprecedented value. [Ref. 14: p. 40]
The HAE UAV CONOPS contends that the Tier II Plus will be highly
survivable for a number of reasons. Its high operating altitude of 65,000 feet
will allow it to avoid most enemy air defenses. The Tier II Plus will employ
standoff tactics when feasible, and on-board and off-board warning will allow
some dynamic threat avoidance. The air vehicle will also have limited on-
board electronic counter measures (ECM). [Ref. 12: p. 2-1,4]
The following is a list of key areas that the CONOPS states the HAE
UAV be able to support [Ref. 12: p. 2-4,5]:
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• "Stand-off surveillance in peace, crisis, and war." The HAE
UAV will be able to perform its mission at high altitudes thus
reducing the threat of enemy engagement.
• "Support targeting and Battle Damage Assessment." The
high resolution sensor capability of the HAE UAV will support
precision strikes and enhance a quick restrike capability through
NRT BDA.
• "Support targeting of time critical targets." The HAE UAV
will allow the NRT observation of dynamic events and provide a
means to see time-critical targets through dynamic retasking.
• "Intelligence preparation of the battlefield." The operational
range of 3000 nautical miles and the 24 hour loiter capability will
allow the HAE UAV to provide continuous coverage of near and far
areas of interest. Dynamic retasking will allow for coverage of time-
critical areas of interest.
• "Situation Awareness." The combination of long loiter time,
broad area coverage, all weather sensors, and a NRT wide
communications bandwidth will significantly improve the
commander's sensitivity to ongoing events on the battlefield.
This list highlights some of the possible broad applications of the HAE
UAV system, but it is not a complete list. It is important to note that some of
these potential applications make reference to the dynamic nature of activity
on the battlefield and the need for the HAE UAV to be capable of supporting
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dynamic retasking. This thesis will address how the HAE UAV system may
be utilized to support these time-sensitive applications.
C. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The complete HAE UAV weapon system will consist of an air vehicle
segment, a launch and recovery element (LRE), a mission control element
(MCE), a ground communications element (GCE), and a support element
(SE). Deployment and logistics support, exploitation and distribution of
imagery, storage of data, airspace management and deconfliction, and safety
will also be elements essential to successful mission performance. [Ref. 12: p.
3-18-22] Table 2-1 shows a summary of the planned HAE UAV system
characteristics.
Table 2-1. HAE UAV System Characteristics. From Ref. [12].
CHARACTERISTIC HAE UAV TIER II PLUS
Gross Take Off Weight >20,000 lb.
Mission Duration 24 hours on station
True Air Speed 300-400 knots
Loiter Altitude 50,000-65,000 feet
Operating Radius 3000 nautical miles
Survivability Measures Threat Warning and limited ECM
Command and Control UHF Milsat (pn)/Ku band (sec)/CDL
Sensors SAR: 1 m search; 0.3 m spot
EO: NIIRS 6+
IR: NIIRS 5+
Ground Motion Target Indication
Coverage per Mission 40,000 sq. NM. search imagery or 1,900 spot
(2x2 Km) image frames
Sensor data transmission Wide Band Comsat: 1.5-50 Mbits/sec
LOS wide band (CDL): 137 Mbits/sec
Data Exploitation Existing and Programmed:
JSIPS, CARS, ETRAC/MIES, JICs, CIG/SS,
NPIC
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1. Air Vehicle Segment
It is anticipated that a deployable air segment will include four Tier II
Plus and two Tier III Minus vehicles, however, this thesis will focus on the
operations of the Tier II Plus only [Ref. 12: p. 3-5]. The air vehicle segment
will include components such as sensor payloads, avionics, SATCOM
(satellite communication) and LOS datalinks. The sensors that will be
carried are SAR, EO, IR, and Ground Motion Target Indication (GMTI). The
EO and IR sensors have an objective National Imagery Interpretability
Rating Scale (N1IRS) of 6+ and 5+ respectively. The air vehicle will be fully
autonomous during take-off, flight, and recovery and will not require man in
the loop remote piloting during the mission, however, the vehicle will be
responsive to remote piloting when dynamically retasked to support time-
critical requirements. [Ref. 12: p. 2-5]
Command and Control (C2) of the air vehicle will be perfumed using
ultra high frequency (UHF) Milsat as the primary means, and a Ku band
SATCOM link as a redundant method for over-the-horizon (OTH)
communications. The UHF system will be a full duplex link. C2 will be
performed using the Common Data Link (CDL) for LOS communications
within range of the MCE. [Ref. 12: p. 6-2]
Sensor data transmission will be sent via commercial satellite such as
PANAMSAT or INTELSAT when the air vehicle is operating OTH. This will
be a simplex link only. When the vehicle is operating within LOS, the CDL
will be used. Although the HAE UAV will have the capability to transmit
data at a maximum rate of 137 Mbits/s for LOS communications, not all
users will be able to receive at this rate. [Ref. 12: p. 6-2]
2. Launch and Recovery Element
The LRE will be responsible for preparation of the HAE UAV for
launch, launch of the air vehicle, and recovery of the vehicle after mission
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completion. The LRE will pre-flight the air vehicle and verify the status of
the onboard systems prior to launch. Before launch the LRE will receive the
mission plan electronically from the MCE and then load the plan into the
HAE UAV. During launch, the LRE will control the air vehicle and
coordinate with local air traffic control before handing off the vehicle to the
MCE. During recovery, the LRE will monitor or control the UAV while
coordinating with local air traffic control. [Ref. 12: p. 3-9,10]
3. Mission Control Element
Once airborne, the MCE will be responsible for the air vehicle. These
responsibilities include sensor control, flight control, and mission planning.
According to the CONOPS, the MCE will have the ability to dynamically
retask the HAE to perform time critical missions in accordance with
established priorities. A total of three HAE UAVs may be retasked
simultaneously, although sensor data can only be received by one air vehicle
at a time. The MCE will be able to receive sensor data from the HAE at the
maximum rate of 137 Mbits/s, and then send the data to exploitation centers
or store it for up to 24 hours. [Ref. 12: p. 3-10]
The MCE will be the primary control node that allows battlefield
commanders to get the information that they need in NRT. This will be
facilitated by the MCE's ability to dynamically retask the HAE UAV to
accommodate changing priorities. Dynamically retasking may involve
changing the sensor's area of interest, or it may mean that the MCE directs
the HAE UAV to a different location. Additionally, the MCE will be capable
of providing operational commanders with "quick look" voice or tactical
reports via Trojan Spirit and Defense Integrated Secure Network (DISN) in
response to tactical requests. [Ref. 12: p. 3-10,18]
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4. Ground Communication Element
The GCE will consist of all the ground equipment necessary to
maintain secure communications with the HAE UAV. The components will
include a 6m dish antenna for the Ku-band earth terminal and a Modular
Interoperable Surface Terminal (MIST) with 2m X-band antenna for the
CDL. The GCE will support voice and data communication for tasking and
mission coordination and will receive information from existing intelligence
systems (e.g., Tactical Reconnaissance Intelligence Service (TRIXS), Tactical
Information Broadcast Service (TIBS), and Tactical Receive Equipment and
Related Applications (TRAP)/Tactical Data Information Exchange (TADIX-
B)). These communication links will support HAE UAV mission operations
and activities such as the receipt of tasking, mission coordination, imagery
dissemination, and dynamic threat avoidance. [Ref. 12: p. 3-10,11]
5. Support Element
The support element consists of all the necessary support personnel
and equipment to maintain and operate the HAE UAV system. This includes
maintenance personnel, spare parts, power generators, maintenance vans,
trailers, test equipment, and tools. Maintenance manpower will support a
four hour turnaround for the air vehicles and provide corrective and
preventative maintenance for all HAE UAV system components. [Ref. 12: p.
3-11]
D. MISSIONS AND TASKS
According to the CONOPS, the HAE UAV will be a valuable part of
DARO's Integrated Strategy for Airborne Reconnaissance during times of
peace, for military operations other than war, during regional crisis and
limited deployments, and for forward deployed wartime operations. Used in
conjunction with other RSTA platforms such as JSTARS, the U-2, Guardrail,
and other short and medium range UAVs, the HAE UAV will act as a force
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multiplier. In addition to the potential applications listed previously, the
CONOPS also suggests the following list as possible applications of the HAE
UAV system: [Ref. 12: p. 3-1,2]
• "Near real time (NRT) targeting and Precision Strike."
The HAE UAV will be able to monitor real time events and
locate and identify mobile targets with its precise sensors and
then relay this information to commanders in NRT. This will
shorten the targeting cycle and allow for more accurate
targeting of time critical targets. The HAE UAVs sensors will
also provide the resolution necessary to use precision guided
munitions to improve battlefield efficiency.
• "NRT combat assessment." The HAE UAV will provide
commanders an on-going view of the battlefield and will allow for
combat assessment of planned and executed operations in NRT.
• "Wide area surveillance." The HAE UAV will provide high
resolution imagery of large areas (40,000 NM2) deep into enemy
territory for long periods of time.
• "Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations." The HAE UAV will
be able to perform missions that could not normally be done by
manned aircraft due to significant military or political risks.
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• "Enemy order of battle information." The HAE UAV will
allow for a quick means to track enemy order of battle information,
including areas where there is not much information available.
• "Blockade and Quarantine Enforcement." The HAE UAV
will support economic, military, and drug enforcement
blockades as well as quarantine missions to free up patrolling
assets for other activities.
• "Humanitarian Aid." The HAE UAV will be able to survey
damage caused by natural disasters and support other
humanitarian aid operations.
This is not a complete list of possible areas where the HAE UAV could
add value to military operations. The services are interested in using the
HAE UAV for other purposes. The Air Force is exploring the possibility of
integrating the HAE UAV into a plan called "closed-loop precision strike."
During Desert Storm, some targets were hit several times because it was
uncertain if the target had been destroyed during previous attacks. In
"closed-loop precision strike," the Air Force could use the HAE UAV to
monitor an air strike and then provide immediate feedback to the operators
concerning the effectiveness of the attack. This could reduce the use of




1. Line-of-sight High Data Rate Imagery
Figure 2-3 shows how the HAE will have the capability to transmit
sensor data at a rate of 137 Mbits/s through the CDL in accordance with the
requirements stated in the "System Capability Document for the Common
High Altitude Endurance (HAE) UAV Support to Military
Operations (Via Common Data links)
HAE UAV
Single Receire
Location at s Time




Figure 2-3. LOS imagery transmission strategy. From Ref. [12].
Data Link - Class 1, Document No. 7681990" [Ref. 15: p. 1.0a]. This will be a
full duplex link. 137 Mbit/s is the maximum rate at which data can be
transmitted. The LOS mode of operations allows for the greatest amount of
data transmission. The MCE is capable of receiving the data at that rate as
well as other theater exploitation sites that might want the data. However,
most users in the field are currently not capable of receiving data at such a
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high rate. Most of these tactical users will have communications equipment
that is limited to T-l data rates at best. This means that tactical users will
only be able to receive that data at rates from 1.5 to 10 Mbits/s. [Ref. 12: p. 6-
2]
2. Long Haul High Data Rate Imagery
SATCOM will be necessary for OTH imagery transmission, as shown
in Figure 2-4. Any satellite which operates in the Ku commercial band can
be a candidate for use. Primary candidates include PANAMSAT and
INTELSAT. Because of the data rate limitations imposed by these and other
High Altitude Endurance (HAE) UAV Support to Military Operations (Via
Ku Commercial Satcom)
• Simultaneous Channelized






Figure 2-4. SATCOM imagery transmission strategy. From Ref. [12].
Ku-band satellites, the maximum data rate of 137 Mbits/s will not be possible
in this mode of operation. It is anticipated the maximum data rate that will
be achievable through SATCOM will be 50 Mbits/s with a minimum of 10
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Mbits/s. The MCE and other capable exploitation sites will be able to receive
data at these rates. However, most tactical field users will be limited to
reception at T-l data rates. This challenge may be overcome if all data is
first passed through the MCE and then to tactical users, but this may not
meet the requirements of a time-critical situation. [Ref. 12: p. 6-2]
F. EXPLOITATION
HAE UAV imagery will be exploited primarily through existing
exploitation centers and systems. These exploitation sites include the
Common Imagery Ground/ Surface Station (CIG/SS), Contingency Airborne
Reconnaissance System (CARS), Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator
(ETRAC), Modernized Imagery Exploitation System (MIES), Joint Services
Imagery Processing System (JSIPS), and the National Photographic
Interpretation Center (NPIC). HAE imagery may also be exploited in the
theater Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs). Interfaces and communication
links between the MCE and exploitation sites must still be defined. [Ref. 12:
p. 3-19]
G. COMMAND AND CONTROL
The way in which the HAE UAV system integrates into the command
and control structure will have a definite impact on its mission performance.
The command and control structure described herein is taken from the HAE
UAV CONOPS and provides an early discussion of how command and control
might work if the HAE UAV is operationally employed. It aims to maximize
the operational utility of the HAE UAV within existing theater command and
control structures [Ref. 12: p. 4-1].
United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) will have Combatant
Command over all HAE UAV assets. Air Combat Command, the air
component of USACOM, will exercise operational control (OPCON) over all
HAE UAV assets during peacetime operations. Such operations include
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training and exercises. Theater CINCs who want to use the HAE UAV
system must issue a request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS may
approve the request based upon coordination with USACOM/ACC and
availability of HAE UAV assets. An HAE UAV attachment will then be
deployed to support the CINC. During exercises, the deployed HAE UAVs
will fall under the exercise command structure. [Ref. 12: p. 4-1]
During contingency or support of wartime operations, HAE UAV
detachments will fall under the command of the Unified CINCs. CINCs will
have full OPCON of the HAE UAV detachment during their employment or
deployment. Consequently, all HAE UAVs will be considered theater assets
to be used to support the theater CINC or Joint Force Commander (JFC).
[Ref. 12: p. 4-1,2]
H. TASKING
The theater J-2 assigned by the JFC will be responsible for the
collection management of the HAE UAV system. This will involve accepting
all Requests For Information (RFI), prioritizing these requests based on the
JFC's objectives, and defining reporting requirements. The J-2 and his staff
will make recommendations concerning mission and target priority for
reconnaissance assets. RFIs will be handled using the existing architecture
for collection management and will be prioritized by the J-2 based on the
CINCs essential elements of information (EEI). The J-2 will also be
responsible for managing the exploitation, production, and dissemination of
all the intelligence collected by the HAE UAV. [Ref. 12: p. 4-2,3]
Once the J-2 has fulfilled these responsibilities, the Joint Force Air
Component Commander (JFACC) will schedule sorties for the HAE UAV
based upon the requirements given him by the J-2. The JFACC will be
responsible for integrating the HAE UAV into the Air Control Plan (ACP) so
as to deconflict manned and unmanned operations in the same airspace. All
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HAE UAV sorties will be tasked in accordance with the Air Tasking Order
(ATO). [Ref. 12: p. 4-2]
Although a possible process for tasking has been described here in
brief, there are concerns about the efficiency of such a process, especially
when time is the critical factor. How the HAE UAV will be tasked to meet
dynamic collection requirements is still in question. This section has
described a tasking process, according to the CONOPS, that is not specifically
designed to support dynamic collection requirements. Chapter III will
describe this normal tasking process according to the joint doctrine stipulated
within the joint publications. Chapter VI will describe a process designed
specifically to support dynamic collection requirements.
Even though normal collection management processes did not meet the
warfighter's dynamic needs during Desert Storm, there is optimism that the
HAE UAV may bring a new capability to the battlefield that will help to solve
some of these problems. (Flaws in the tasking process that surfaced during
Desert Storm will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.) How the HAE
UAV will be dynamically retasked at tactical levels in a joint operating
environment is at the heart of this problem.
The multi-user, multi-purpose, large volume collection characteristics
of the HAE UAV program combined with the commitment to provide
exploitable imagery to theater intelligence centers, selected imagery to
operations centers, and direct dissemination to tactical elements
makes mission management a serious challenge [Ref. 12: p. 3-12].
Meeting this challenge with success may be a formidable task, but the
HAE UAV appears to offer a way to help satisfy the NRT imagery needs of
warfighters on the battlefield. Before a clear judgment can be made about
the ability of the HAE UAV to support its claims, it will be necessary to
examine how tasking and collection management works within the
intelligence cycle. Chapters III and IV will provide this kind of examination
24
and bring to light some deficiencies associated with the intelligence and
collection management process.
It will also be important to understand what kind of NRT imagery
needs the tactical commander may experience in combat. It would be very
difficult, if not impossible, to describe the typical scenario in which a
commander on the battlefield finds himself in need of NRT imagery. Chapter
V will attempt to describe a probable scenario in which a tactical commander
requires NRT imagery. Once these ideas have been fully developed, it will be
possible to draw conclusions on how the HAE might be integrated into the
"intelligence machine" and what streamlined process will allow for the most
timely dynamic retasking. It will also shed light on whether the HAE UAV is




III. COLLECTION MANAGEMENT FOR JOINT OPERATIONS
A. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE
The process that occurs when a tactical commander makes a request
for imagery intelligence and then receives the final intelligence product is not
a simple one-for-one exchange. The process, known as the intelligence cycle
and shown in Figure 3-1, involves several steps that must be fulfilled before
the process is complete. In most circumstances, all the steps must be taken
so that the final product is useful to the original requester. The steps
necessary to complete the intelligence cycle are planning and direction,
collection, processing, production, and dissemination. This thesis is focused
on the tasking activities that occur during the planning and direction, and
collection phases of the process. These steps occur at the front end of the
intelligence cycle, but they can be better understood in the context of all the
other activities that must occur during the entire cycle. This section will
provide the reader with a basic understanding of the steps necessary to turn
a request for information (RFI) into a useful intelligence product. The cycle
will be described within the context of providing intelligence support to joint
operations and will be written in accordance with Joint Publication 2-0, Joint
Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations [Ref. 17].
1. Planning and Direction
During this first step of the intelligence cycle, the commander's
guidance and strategic objectives are defined. Based on these factors,
essential elements of information (EEI) will be defined and a collection plan
will be developed. EEIs are defined as the "critical items of information
regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a
particular time" to assist him is reaching logical decisions [Ref. 17: p. GL-9].
In the case of joint operations, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) or theater
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CINC will be responsible for determining the EEIs and directing the
development of the collection plan. It is also the time when the command
relationships are defined between all the participating intelligence elements
within the joint force. Procedures should be established for dissemination
among superior, lateral, and subordinate intelligence organizations. The level
of support required from national intelligence organizations will be defined
as well. [Ref. 17: p. 11-4,5]
Figure 3-1. The Intelligence Cycle. After Ref. [17].
All requests for information originating from the various sources
within the joint force will be registered, validated, and prioritized for the
appropriate collection, processing, production, and dissemination through a
process called Collection Requirements Management (CRM). See Figure 3-2
for the definition of CRM according to Joint Pub 2.0.
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CRM activities include the prioritization of the requirements in
accordance with the collection plan to support the intelligence needs of
component commanders and the joint commander. CRM processes then
transform these requirements into tasking for the appropriate organic,
attached, and supporting forces. Organic intelligence assets are those
permanently assigned to the requesting activity's command; attached assets
are assigned to the joint force to support specific operations; supporting
assets are from other theaters or areas of responsibility (AOR) that are
tasked to support the joint force commander within his AOR. Throughout
this entire phase, the evaluation of the collection strategy and the
assessment of its effectiveness to meet ever-changing intelligence needs are
performed through CRM. [Ref. 17: p. 11-4,5]
Collection Requirements Management (CRM) - The authoritative
development and control of collection, processing, exploitation, and/or
reporting requirements that normally result in either the direct tasking
of assets over which the collection manager has authority, or the
generation of single-discipline tasking requests to collection management
authorities at a higher, lower, or lateral echelon to accomplish the
collection mission.
Collection Operations Management (COM) - The authoritative
direction, scheduling, and control of specific collection operations and
associated processing, exploitation, and reporting resources.
Figure 3-2. CRM and COM definitions. [Ref. 17: p. GL-6]
2. Collection
The collection phase of the intelligence cycle involves the physical
acquisition of raw information from many sources such as human intelligence
(HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT)
such as planned to be provided by the HAE UAV. It also involves passing
this information to the necessary processing elements. In order to satisfy the
intelligence needs of operations, joint force collection management must be
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able to task all collection assets within the joint force, and also obtain
support from theater and national assets. These assets will be tasked to
support the intelligence requirements of all command levels within the joint
force. More than one asset may be used to satisfy a particular requirement in
order to insure that the information collected is accurate, and to allow for
redundancy if one of the collection methods fails. [Ref. 17: p. 11-5,6] The next
section will give a more detailed description of the collection management
process.
The J-2, the Director for Intelligence on the joint staff, is responsible
for identifying the intelligence deficiencies, turning these into matching
requirements, tasking the appropriate collection assets, and ensuring that
processing, production and dissemination occur. The J-2 will rely on the
JFC's pre-determined EEIs to accomplish this. It is also essential that the J-
2 and all other senior intelligence officers in the joint force understand the
requirements of higher, lower, and adjacent command levels to allow for the
most efficient collection of information. Having knowledge of the other
command level's requirements may prevent redundant RFIs. For example, if
a division commander is aware that his corp commander requires collection of
an activity of similar interest, then the division commander may not need to
submit a redundant RFI for the same information. The J-2 must also
understand the capabilities and limitations of the collection assets available
to him so that he can make accurate assessments of the lead-time necessary
to task, process, and produce intelligence. This will allow the J-2 to satisfy
requirements efficiently without wasting collection assets on requirements
that cannot be fulfilled in time to satisfy the request. [Ref. 17: p. II-6]
Operations personnel are also involved in the collection phase of the
intelligence cycle. Once requirements have been identified, consolidated,
prioritized, and tasked against the appropriate collectors during CRM, the
actual direction of collection operations is performed by operators during
30
Collection Operations Management (COM). [Ref. 18] Following COM, the
information is collected during mission execution by the operators. According
to Major Marshall, author of Near-Real-Time Intelligence on the Tactical
Battlefield, these collection efforts should be coordinated among the services
and intelligence agencies to stimulate cross-cueing and reduce the
duplication of effort. [Ref. 19: p. 11] The J-2 must act as the liaison among
these various intelligence elements to insure that the necessary coordination
occurs within the joint force.
3. Processing
Once information has been collected, it must be processed into a format
that can be analyzed by intelligence personnel. Examples of processing
include document and communications translation, film processing, and
signal processing [Ref. 19: p. 11]. This may require format conversions, the
use of computer applications, printing, and video production [Ref. 17: p. II-7].
In the past, processing time greatly increased the time required to get an
intelligence product to the original requester. The explosion of technology in
the areas of computing, electro-optics, and communication systems has
significantly reduced the processing time needed to provide some intelligence
products. [Ref. 19: p. 11] However, processing time still creates limitations
on the ability of the intelligence system to satisfy real-time intelligence
requirements.
4. Production
During the production phase, processed information derived from
single or multiple sources must be analyzed, evaluated, interpreted, and
integrated into a single product for the consumer. This may involve utilizing
information from existing data bases, using data that has just been collected
and processed in real time, or both. The analyst responsible for the
production of a particular product must be aware of who will use the
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intelligence and for what purpose. This will allow the analyst to eliminate
unnecessary information and to tailor the intelligence to meet the
commander's specific needs. The analysts must also be objective and
unbiased during their analysis. If information from different sources is
conflicting, the differences must be resolved. If the differences can not be
resolved, the commander must be made aware of the uncertainties. [Ref. 17:
p. II-8]
During joint operations, the J-2 will coordinate production activities
from national to tactical levels. This will prevent unnecessary duplication of
effort and allow for mutually supportive production. The J-2 must also
identify those organizations that are capable of contributing to the production
effort, and ensure that the JFC gets the intelligence products and services
that he needs. [Ref. 17: p. II-9]
The final intelligence product should integrate collected information
with previously collected information from all sources to provide the
commander with an overall picture. The analyst should develop this "overall
picture" based on his knowledge of enemy doctrine, strategy, tactics, and
equipment, the current situation, and the commander's immediate and
strategic objectives. The true value of the intelligence product will not be a
measure of the amount of intelligence provided, but its ability to support the
commander's capacity to plan and make decisions regarding combat
operations. [Ref. 19: p. 12-13] In a time-sensitive situation, the value of the
intelligence product may be lost if it does not support the commander's
timeline. Consequently, the time required during the production phase




Dissemination is the final phase of the intelligence cycle. It is during
this phase that the cycle is completed and the original requester receives the
intelligence in a suitable form that supports his RFI. There are many ways
that intelligence can be disseminated and the intelligence producer must
consider the needs of the user when determining how to disseminate the final
product. Some examples of disseminated products are verbal reports, printed
documents, photographs, video tapes, and viewgraphs. The means by which
these products can be disseminated are physical transfer, fax transmissions,
video-teleconferencing, telephones, data transfer through computer networks
such as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), briefings,
and tactical radio and satellite broadcasts such as the Tactical Information
Broadcast Service (TIBS) and the Tactical Related Applications (TRAP)
broadcast. The last method is especially useful to provide tactical
commanders with time-sensitive intelligence. [Ref. 17: p. 11-10,11]
Joint doctrine stipulates that a "push-pull" methodology should be
applied during the dissemination process. This will allow commanders to
"pull" only what intelligence they need to support operations and allow
higher echelon commanders to "push" intelligence that they think is critical
to the lower echelons. JFCs should ensure that critical, time-sensitive
intelligence is available from adjacent and higher commands through the
"push-pull" process to support joint force operations. The dissemination
phase of the intelligence cycle must be continuously reviewed to ensure the
needs of the joint operation are being fulfilled. [Ref. 17: p. 11-11]
B. THEATER COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
Collection management involves all the phases of the intelligence
cycle. It is a continuous and iterative process. Collection management is
defined as "the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection
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requirements" and tasking the appropriate collection sources to satisfy the
intelligence needs [Ref. 17: p. GL-6]. This thesis is concerned with the idea of
dynamic retasking within the theater, how it works, and if it can be made to
work better through the use of the HAE UAV. This section will focus on the
areas of collection management that involve the various aspects of tasking.
This will include all the steps of the process beginning when a requirement is
realized at a tactical level and ending with the actual tasking of the
appropriate collection asset. The focus will be on how the RFI flows through
the system. The procedure and the entities involved in the tasking process
will be identified. For the purposes of this thesis, the RFI will be initiated
within an Army division and will be followed through to the actual mission
execution by collector operators.
The first three steps in the collection management process for this
example will occur within the Army's infrastructure. Army Field Manual
(AFM) 34-2 Collection Management and Synchronizations Planning describes
in detail the steps and processes involved in collection management within
the Army. Figure 3-3 shows the collection management functions and
process as depicted by AFM 34-2. The next three sections will describe
collection management from an Army perspective and will focus only on the
first three steps of the cycle. At the completion of step three, task or request
collection, the RFI will flow out of the Army's infrastructure into the joint
command infrastructure. At this point, joint publications will be the primary
reference for following the RFI's activity.
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•Prioritize SORs for collection assets
Figure 3-3. Collection Management functions and processes. After Ref. [20].
1. Develop Requirements
The identification, prioritization, and refinement of uncertainties
concerning the threat and the battlefield environment that a command
must resolve to accomplish its mission. [AFM 34-2]
This first step in the collection management process is to develop
requirements. The commander must assess the battlefield environment and
make decisions about what information he needs to accomplish his objectives.
To complete this step, he must provide answers to three questions: what
must be collected, where it must be collected, and when it must be collected.
The commander must create a prioritized list of needs that will answer these
questions for each need. [Ref. 20: p. 3-1,3]
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As an example of this first step of the collection management process,
consider an army commander who will generate questions that need to be
answered. These questions will depend largely on the situation in which the
commander finds himself. For this example, consider a commander who has
communicated with higher and lower echelons and determines that he needs
to know the following information: Will a given enemy tank division
counterattack through a particular zone on the battlefield? Is the enemy
defending a certain region with less than a battalion? When will another
enemy tank regiment counterattack in a specific area? These questions may
be designated as Priority Information Requests (PIR) or Specific Information
Requirements (SIR) by the commander and may be listed in an order that
reflects their relative priority. [Ref. 20: p. 3-2,3]
The commander will not have to make these decisions without
adequate support. Army intelligence officers at the division level of command
(G-2) will provide support to the commander in a number of ways. G-2s will
coordinate the intelligence effort by identifying requirements based on the
commander's guidance and concepts of operation. G-2s will be also provide
the commander with information regarding weather, terrain, and the enemy.
They will use their intelligence skills to reduce uncertainties on the
battlefield and provide the commander with critical intelligence. G-2s will
also be familiar with the enemy so that they can provide the commander with
information on patterns of enemy activity and reveal indicators which may
help to identify requirements. [Ref. 21: p. 2-3] G-2s will provide the
commander with information regarding collection assets as well. For
example: if the commander identifies a requirement that demands the use of
non-organic collection assets, then the G-2 will inform the commander of the
ramifications of such tasking (in this example, the flow of the RFI for non-
organic support will be described). [Ref. 20: p. 3-4]
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Once the requirements have been identified, they must be analyzed.
Analysis will help to determine the best way to satisfy each requirement and
may reveal that some requirements can be satisfied with existing intelligence
without collection. The steps of analysis are record, validate, consolidate, and
prioritize requirements. [Ref. 20: p. 3-4-7]
• Record Requirements - Register all requirements from higher
headquarters, adjacent, and subordinate units with those within
the command.
• Validate Requirements - Ensure that all requirements are
feasible. If a requirement is not feasible, provide feedback to original
requester. Ensure that there is justification for the requirement and
identify who needs the results. Check immediate data bases for
intelligence that might satisfy the requirement to avoid unnecessary
collection.
• Consolidate Requirements -Merge similar requirements without
losing traceability to all the interested parties.
• Prioritize Requirements - Arrange the requirements in an order
that will best satisfy the command's mission and objectives. This
order may be affected by the time-sensitivity of specific
requirements and by the commander's designation of PIRs. PIRs
are requests deemed mission essential, that when left unanswered
could endanger mission accomplishment.
The final step in the requirements development phase is to develop
SIR sets. SIRs take a requirement and break it into smaller, more detailed
questions. These questions, when answered, provide the information needed
to satisfy the overall intelligence requirement. [Ref. 20]
2. Develop Collection Plan
The integrated and synchronized plan that selects the best collector to
cover each requirement. It is a graphic representation of the collection
37
strategy. This is the first step in the collection management process
that involves mission management. [AFM 34-2]
The purpose of this phase of the cycle is to create a collection strategy
that will employ collection assets to satisfy the command's intelligence
requirements in the most effective and efficient manner. The goal is to
synchronize the collection effort by using collection assets in the right place
at the right time on the battlefield. Failure to complete an adequate
collection plan could lead to a false picture of the battlefield created by using
an inappropriate collector or a true picture of the battlefield, but one collected
too late to be of any value. [Ref. 20: p. 3-9-10]
The first step in developing a collection plan is to evaluate the
collection resources in terms of availability, capability, vulnerability and
performance history. The G-2, as the collection manager, must always be
aware of the availability of collectors. He will primarily be concerned with
organic collectors, those within his echelon of command, but it is also
important that he know what non-organic assets are available to complement
organic collection capabilities. The G-2 must also be knowledgeable of
organic and non-organic collector capabilities. Range, technical capabilities,
loiter time, geolocation accuracy, sensor capabilities, and reporting timeliness
are all factors that the G-2 must consider. The G-2 will also need to assess
the threat to the collector and its corresponding vulnerability within the area
of interest. Finally, the G-2 should rely on his previous experience to
determine which collectors have performed well in the past. Continued
responsiveness, accuracy, and timeliness over a period of time may increase
the G-2s confidence in a particular collector's ability to meet the commander's
intelligence requirements. [Ref. 20: p. 3-10-11] This factor may very well
influence the collection manager's decisions the most.
The next step is to develop the actual collection strategy. During this
phase the collection manager will select the resources that he plans to utilize
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for collection. For organic assets, he will be able to task them directly. He
may recommend tasking to subordinate echelons, and he may request support
from higher headquarters. AFM 34-2 concedes that organic assets are
usually more responsive, but it warns collection managers not to depend
solely on them for intelligence and collection support. In some cases non-
organic collectors may be more capable. [Ref. 20: p. 3-11] Synchronization is
also a part of developing the collection strategy. During synchronization, the
collection manager starts at a point in time when the commander needs the
intelligence and plans backwards to allow time for dissemination, analysis,
processing, collection and tasking. In this way, he can synchronize all the
operations that must occur prior to the final receipt of the intelligence. [Ref.
20: p. 3-14-16]
The final step is to develop Specific Order Requests (SOR) sets. SORs
are derived from the SIRs developed during requirements development. SIRs
are the detailed questions that must be answered to support the commander's
objectives. SORs transform the SIR questions into tasking orders for the
collectors. SORs must be specific without being overly restrictive. This
allows collectors the flexibility to report information that was not anticipated.
SORs must also be prioritized and tailored to accommodate the chosen
collection system. [Ref. 20: p. 3-16]
The following example illustrates the need for the development of a
collection plan. A hypothetical corps commander's primary concern is
detecting and tracking an enemy tank regiment, which poses as the principal
counterattack threat. This same corps has priority for an upcoming JSTARS
mission. The corps mission manager wants to use JSTARS' wide area
surveillance capabilities to identify and follow armor movements and also use
preplanned problem sets of national imagery systems to see major choke
points along probable enemy tank regiment approach paths. He also
prioritizes corps HUMINT requirements to emphasize the collection of
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information regarding enemy reconnaissance activity from enemy prisoners
of war or refugees. A collection plan is necessary to coordinate all of these
collection activities to insure that they are synchronized to support the most
effective collection effort. [Ref. 20: p. 3-7]
3. Task or Request Collection
Implementation of the collection plan through execution of system-
specific tasking or request mechanisms. [AFM 34-2]
Tasking occurs when the order is actually levied against the collector
prior to mission execution. An example of this step might be when the
collection manager uses a multiple assets tasking message (MATM) format
for IMINT tasking of the JSTARS. Optimum tasking takes place when the
collector clearly understands what to do upon receipt of the request. This can
be accomplished when the proper message format is used by the requester
and all the necessary data fields are complete. There are a number of
formats and procedures that the collection manager must be able to use in
order to task the various collectors. These formats and procedures will vary
based upon the commander's need to use organic or non-organic collection
assets. If the assets required are organic, that is within his command, then
he may task them directly. If the assets are not organic, then he must
submit his request to the next level of command. Before submitting his
request, the G-2 must be familiar with the different tasking formats for the
distinct collection systems and the agencies that control them. [Ref. 20: p. 3-
17,18]
Depending upon the collection requirement, national, theater, or
echelons above corp (EAC) collection assets may be necessary. For support
from national or EAC systems, Defense Intelligence Agency Manuals (DIAM)
define the required procedures and request formats. [Ref. 20: p. 3-17,18] For
our example, we will assume that the request is submitted for support from a
theater collection asset, such as the planned HAE UAV. In a joint operation,
the request must flow from the division through the chain of command until
reaching the component level. The number of command levels the request
must pass through will depend on the size of the component within the joint
force. Once the request has reached the component level, it may be
submitted to the J-2 for theater collection.
4. The J-2 and the Joint Intelligence Center
The J-2 must establish a flexible and tailored architecture of
procedures, organizations, and equipment focused on the joint
commander's needs. This intelligence system of systems complements
and reinforces the organic capabilities at each echelon and, when
necessary, provides direct support to subordinate commanders whose
organic capabilities cannot be brought to bear. [Joint Pub 2-0]
Our example illustrates a situation when the organic capabilities are
not sufficient to meet the intelligence need. Therefore, it is the J-2's
responsibility to provide direct support to these commanders. AFM 34-2 says
that "there is no standard collection management organization at existing
joint-level commands" [Ref. 20: p. 5-1]. The J-2 is charged with establishing
the intelligence architecture that will support the needs of commanders at all
echelons.
Before this architecture can be established, the JFC will normally
stand up a Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) from which the J-2 can centrally
manage the intelligence effort. It is here that the J-2 and his staff will
manage the collection effort and all other parts of the intelligence cycle for
the joint force. The J-2 staff will be essential to provide the JFC and the J-2
with an understanding of each component's intelligence capabilities,
limitations, and requirements. [Ref. 17: p. IV- 9]
The J-2 has specific responsibilities during the collection phase of the
intelligence cycle. The J-2 must devise the theater collection plan that will
incorporate the use of national systems and systems that are organic to the
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theater. The J-2 must also identify, prioritize, and validate those
requirements that originate within the components needing support from
theater or national collection systems. The J-2 must then task the
components for collection. During these activities, the J-2 will maintain a
record of accomplishment to evaluate the fulfillment of intelligence needs.
[Ref. 17: p. VI-3,4]
Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to
Operations, gives precise guidance for the J-2 and his staff concerning their
responsibilities within the joint force. It is made clear that the J-2 should be
the channel through which requests from the components of a joint force
must travel for intelligence support. [Ref. 17: p. V-2] However, Joint Pub 2-0
does not describe what the organizational structure of the JIC must look like.
The J-2 has the liberty to determine how he wants to manage the intelligence
effort within the guidelines provided by the JFC. Consequently, there are no
standard procedures on how incoming RFIs from the components will be
processed and transformed into routine tasking or dynamic retasking for
time-critical requests. For our example, we will look at how RFIs were
handled during Desert Storm based on the United States Central Command
(USCENTCOM) model.
CRM during Desert Storm began with a review of the intelligence
requirements by the Daily Aerial Reconnaissance Syndicate (DARS). This
committee was headed by the J-2's collection manager and membership
included JFC staff and component representatives. DARS would review
intelligence requirements and provide guidance within the JIC on which
requirements would be met. The requirements were then passed to the
appropriate intelligence discipline such as IMINT or SIGINT. Within these
disciplines were Joint Collection Management Cells (JCMC). JCMCs were
responsible for prioritization and deconfliction of requirements, and worked
tasking for a specific platform, such as the U-2. When the JCMCs were
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finished, they passed on their requirements to the Joint Reconnaissance
Center (JRC). [Ref. 22]
5. The J-3 and The Joint Reconnaissance Center
The J-2 establishes collection requirements to meet the JFC's
operational objectives, while the J-3 determines how to employ
assigned RSTA systems available to satisfy the collection
requirements. [Joint Pub 3-55]
Within the J-3 is the JRC. According to joint doctrine, the JRC's
function is to monitor RSTA assets, establish priorities among them to meet
requirements, assign missions to them, deconflict and coordinate RSTA
missions with other operations in the area of responsibility (AOR), and assess
risk to RSTA assets. The JRC must also inform the J-2 if his collection
requirements exceed theater collection capabilities. [Ref. 18]
During Desert Storm, the JRC performed the COM function of the
collection management process. This involved the authoritative direction,
scheduling, and control of collection operations. This control would be
coordinated with the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) who is
responsible for coordinating all air operations in the theater. [Ref. 22]
6. Joint Force Air Component Commander
The J-2 and J-3 will normally work with the components and the
JFACC, if assigned, to coordinate national and theater reconnaissance
objectives effectively. [Joint Pub 3-55]
Joint doctrine stipulates that the JFC will normally designate a
JFACC to "exploit the capabilities of joint air operations through a cohesive
joint air operations plan and a responsive and integrated control system"
[Ref. 23: p. vi]. The JFACC is responsible for planning, coordinating,
allocating, and tasking joint air operations in accordance with the JFC's
objectives. The JFACC fulfills these responsibilities through a process called
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the joint air tasking cycle. The Air Tasking Order (ATO) is an essential part
of the tasking cycle. Throughout the ATO cycle, the JFACC plans,
coordinates and tasks air operations in a manner that maximizes their
effectiveness and ensures deconfliction. The JFACC resides in the Joint Air
Operations Center (JAOC). The JAOC is organized to support the planning
of future operations and the execution of current operations. [Ref. 23: p. vii,
viii, IV-4-11]
Once a collection requirement has been identified, validated,
prioritized, and coordinated among the J-2, J-3 and components, the
appropriate collector(s) will be tasked to carry out the mission. This will be
done through the Air Tasking Order. When the appropriate tactical-level
units receive the ATO, they will execute the mission. [Ref. 18,24] This
completes the flow of the RFI from the division level within the Army to




































JFACC-Joint Force Air Component Commander
JAOC-Joint Air Operations Center
Figure 3-4. Notional tasking flow.
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These descriptions of the intelligence cycle and the methodology for
theater collection management demonstrate the hierarchical structure of
current intelligence processes. When non-organic theater asset capabilities
are required, requests for collection initiated at any level must flow up the
chain of command to the decision makers and back down again to the
collector operators. For tactical commanders, this means that their requests
must make a long and time consuming trip from conception to fulfillment.
On today's battlefield, events occur so quickly that information must often be
collected in NRT to be of any value to the commander. A sensor-to-shooter
architecture would be more appropriate for meeting the tactical consumer's
needs for NRT imagery. A dynamic retasking process that allows for a more
direct line of communication between the shooter and the sensor might help
to reduce the time required to satisfy the tactical commander's request.
7. Dynamic Retasking
The RFI flow described in Figure 3-4 describes how normal tasking
occurs. In some situations, time-critical intelligence needs must be satisfied
immediately. During Desert Storm, these types of requirements were met
through a process called quick fires. Quick fires allowed one particular
service component to have control over a specific theater asset for a certain
period of time. During the allotted time period, the component exercised
control over the asset and was able to redirect it to collect against time-
critical requirements. [Ref. 22]
In the author's opinion, quick fires do not represent true dynamic
retasking. In essence, quick fire procedures are more like pre-planned
dynamic retasking. If a component recognizes a time-critical collection
requirement during the quick fire, then he can collect against it. If the
component realizes an immediate need and does not have control over the
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asset, then the process for normal tasking must be used. The process for
normal tasking is not responsive enough to meet NRT requirements.
C. JOINT COLLECTION MANAGEMENT TOOL
The Joint Collection Management Tool (JCMT) is currently being
developed as the migration system for all-source collection management
system within DoD. It was selected by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) to fuse the
functionality of several other collection management systems into one system
for all of the services. Figure 3-5 shows the JCMT Operational Concept.
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Figure 3-5. JCMT Operational Concept. After Ref. [26].
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like the Army's Collection Management Support Tools (CMST), DIA's
Collection Requirements Management Application (CRMA), and the Air
Force's Collection Requirements Management System (CRMS). TRW is
developing JCMT and claims that it will provide state-of-art communications,
advanced databases, and a sophisticated user interface. Plans are for JCMT
to be embedded into the services' intelligence support systems such as
Combat Information System (CIS), All-Source Analysis System (ASAS),
Intelligence Analysis System (IAS), and Joint Maritime Command
Information System (JMCIS). [Ref. 25, 26]
The baseline for JCMT capabilities includes five major areas of
support. These areas are All-Source Requirements, Asset Capabilities and
Availability, Message Processing/Communications, Database Access, and.
Support Tools. Each of these areas will support the following activities: [Ref.
25,26]
• All-Source Requirements - functionality includes support for
requirements registration, validation, prioritization and
consolidation for organic and non-organic requirements. This area
will also support correlation of collected data with the
requirement(s), establishing collectibles, and monitoring the status
of requirements.
• Asset Capabilities and Availability - includes models and
reference data of all collection assets available to the warfighter.
This will include national and theater systems. This area will also
support strategy development, evaluation, and tasking and will
monitor mission scheduling.
• Message processing/Communications - this area will support all
the different collection message types for tasking the various
collectors. The user will be able to update databases and highlight
recent activity. The user will be able to communicate with other
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JCMT users. This area will also correlate message types and
provide the user with word search capabilities.
• Database Access - the user will have access to national collection
management databases.
• Support Tools - provision of maps, office utilities and security
features.
According to the program office, JCMT will be able to provide collection
managers at every echelon with the tools they need to task organic and non-
organic collectors. Currently, JCMT can provide the user with real time data
on the availability of collection assets [Ref. 27]. It is anticipated that this
combined with the collector models and reference data will support the
warfighter's ability to choose the most appropriate collector to meet his
intelligence requirements. Connectivity will also be possible with all other
JCMT users. These and other JCMT capabilities may prove to be useful tools
in satisfying the time-critical collection requirements inherent to the
battlefield.
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IV. PROHIBITORS OF TIMELY INTELLIGENCE
One of the shortcomings we found is that we just don't have an
immediately responsive intelligence capability that will give the
theater commander near-real-time information that he personally
needs to make a decision. General Norman Schwartzkopf [Ref. 19]
The US intelligence infrastructure has some amazing capabilities, but
meeting the needs of every user is not one of them. The military operations
during Desert Storm served as a reminder that the intelligence
infrastructure needs change. For many years during the cold war, US
intelligence systems focused their attention primarily on the Warsaw Pact.
Since most of this information was collected during peacetime, the system
was afforded time to produce intelligence. Similar time was not available
during the military operations of Desert Storm. The rapid development of
the crisis in the Gulf region forced the intelligence system to provide support
for a largely unexpected contingency [Ref. 28: p. 160-2]. Many shortcomings
were identified within the intelligence system, especially with regard to
timeliness. This chapter will discuss some of these deficiencies identified
during Desert Storm and will focus primarily on those areas that directly and
indirectly affect the tasking of collection assets.
A. NATIONAL COLLECTION EMPHASIS
According to Major Marshall, the reason why reconnaissance systems
have not been able to provide the required tactical intelligence support
during conflicts such as Desert Storm is because there has been no
coordinated focus on the needs of the tactical consumer. During the Gulf
War, the Air Force needed six squadrons of RF-4Cs, but could only employ
one and one-half squadrons from the reserves. [Ref. 19: p. 47] Only 5 TR-ls
and 6 U-2s were in the theater. The RF-4Cs, U-2s, TR-ls and Tornadoes
could have provided the much-needed imagery of Kuwait prior to the war, but
they were not survivable enough to fly over the region until the air campaign
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began. Army Brigadier General Scales, director of a Desert Storm special
study, concluded that SR-71s could have filled a gap in Kuwaiti coverage
prior to the air campaign if they had not been moth balled a year before. [Ref.
28: p. 163,179]
A primary reason for the lack of emphasis on the tactical consumer's
needs has been an emphasis on intelligence needs at the strategic level. Most
of the reconnaissance systems in use today were not developed to support the
tactical warfighter, but rather to support decision makers at higher levels. In
the 1950s and 1960s, the strategic mission of the Air Force and the allure of
"black" projects strongly influenced reconnaissance development. This led to
the development of highly classified systems designed to meet strategic
intelligence needs. The famous efforts of Lockheed's "Skunk Works" is an
example of that influence. Because reconnaissance systems such as those
produced by Lockheed were developed in secrecy, they work well alone, but
they do not work well together. Incompatibilities between the various
reconnaissance systems greatly reduces the ability to synchronize the
collection effort on the battlefield. [Ref. 19: p. 48,50]
Another factor that influenced the intelligence infrastructure was
President Dwight D. Eisenhower's strong belief that intelligence systems
should be controlled by civilian agencies for fear of misuse by the military.
Consequently, the intelligence structure of the United States has been
primarily controlled by national agencies since the 1970s. Strategic Air
Command operated air reconnaissance assets at the direction of national
agencies. Additionally, the development and maintenance of a tactical
reconnaissance capability organic to the military was neglected in the
budgeting process leaving obsolete assets to do the job. [Ref. 19: p. 48]
During peacetime, intelligence typically takes a long time to make its
way through analysis done at the national intelligence centers down to
operational and tactical levels. Marshall stipulates that the emphasis on
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peacetime intelligence operations has helped to create the stovepipe
intelligence infrastructure that exists today. This stovepipe infrastructure,
shown in Figure 4-1, consists of a small number of unique airborne assets,
national production centers, theater-level fusion centers, a few organic
tactical assets, and other national technical systems. Marshall states that
these disparate systems have been more responsive to Washington than to
the warfighter. [Ref. 19: p. 48]
This well-rehearsed response to Washington is understandable as
peacetime operations do not normally involve the tactical warfighter. Since





Figure 4-1. Current Stovepipe Architecture. From Ref.
[29].
intelligence system does not usually get much practice during crisis
situations when NRT tactical support is required. Therefore, the system does
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not handle requests for NRT intelligence from tactical levels very efficiently
when crises occur.
Figure 4-1 shows that national, theater, and tactical collection systems
do exist, but that they do not communicate well with one other. The barriers
in the figure illustrate the inability of these systems to carry out mutually
supportive operations. This lack of communication and interoperability
between collection systems inhibits the tactical user's ability to access
national and theater collection resources. The figure implies that there are
equal capabilities at all three levels, but this is untrue. As discussed earlier,
a greater capability exists at the national level with decreasing capabilities
at the theater and tactical levels respectively.
Even though a limited tactical collection capability exists, most
intelligence collection systems were primarily developed to support strategic
decision making and not the tactical warfighter. Today, it appears that the
focus may be shifting somewhat to support the tactical consumer.
Intelligence problems in the Gulf War, the shifting of the cold-war posture to
the post-cold-war posture, and other factors have brought attention to the
need for a more tactical focus. C4I for the Warrior philosophy is making the
warfighter "king." Consequently new systems and technologies are being
developed to support the tactical reconnaissance and surveillance needs of
the warfighter. Adding new systems and technologies alone will not solve the
intelligence problems witnessed in Desert Storm. Integrating these new
tactically focused assets with new capabilities into a strategically developed
infrastructure will require more changes. Concepts of operations and other
doctrine must be developed to support this transition to a more balanced
strategic and tactical emphasis.
As evidence of this growing tactical emphasis, in November of 1993,
the Congressional Authorization Conference published a report that stated,
"tactical reconnaissance is relatively more important to national security
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than at any other time in our history" [Ref 10]. As a result of this report, the
DARO was created to manage the development and acquisition of new
tactical airborne reconnaissance systems. DARO is currently overseeing the
development and demonstration of technologies that will support the tactical
intelligence requirements inherent to the battlefield. Some of the programs
being pursued are the short, medium, and long range UAVs. The HAE UAV
is being developed to support theater intelligence requirements through long
dwell, high altitude surveillance and reconnaissance. [Ref. 10]
B. J-2 STAFF COLLECTION EXPERIENCE
One problem within the theater J-2 staff at the JIC during Desert
Storm was the lack of collection management experience. Due to manpower
limitations and other personnel factors, the theater J-2 was not always able
to bring in military personnel with previous experience in collection
management. Consequently, the learning curve among some J-2 personnel
was steep. Evidence of this was a tremendous increase in the number of
daily collection activities throughout the war. Part of the problem was that
the collection management specialty was not seen as promising for promotion
as were other intelligence specialties. Consequently, there was not an
abundance of officers with collection management experience available. [Ref.
22]
C. LIMITED COLLECTION ASSETS
According to Major Marshall, the limited number of collectors
available on the battlefield significantly impacts the tactical commander. He
states that there are approximately 12 RC-135s and less than 50 TR-ls in the
Air Force inventory. He concludes that this is because the Air Force has
focused on acquiring a limited number of large and expensive collectors at the
expense of the tactical consumer. Help is on the way with JSTARS initial
operational capability coming on board in the mid 1990s. [Ref. 19: p. 59]
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Also, DARO's UAV development effort may provide some relief when and if
the UAVs are ever operational. Even with the hope of new platforms arriving
on the battlefield, the challenge remains to meet unlimited requirements
with a limited amount of resources.
D. SUPPORTING TOOLS FOR COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
During Desert Storm, many of the collection management activities
that occurred within the J-2 at the theater JIC were done manually. There
were no software support tools to aid in the prioritization or tasking of
collectors. Certain tasking messages had to be written out manually. This
turned out to be a long and laborious process. Automation tools were needed
to support the timely processing of collection management activities. [Ref. 22]
Automation tools could have been used to make the tasking process more
efficient through better communication (through automated and
standardized tasking messages and formats), faster tasking message
development, and administrative support functions.
E. AIR TASKING ORDER GENERATION
The JFC or CINC for a theater will usually designate a JFACC during
joint operations to coordinate and control joint air operations. The JFACC
will coordinate the air activities within the theater through the ATO. The
ATO process is currently a 72 hour cycle that includes the steps of JFC and
service component coordination, target development, weaponeering and
allocation, joint ATO development, force execution, and combat assessment.
[Ref. 23] Because of the long time required for planning and coordinating all
air operations through the ATO, there is concern about its timeliness to meet
immediate collection needs.
Currently, there is a struggle between the Air Force and Army over the
control of theater UAVs. General Joseph Ralston, former commander of
ACC, has called for all UAV operations to fall under the ATO. The Army,
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however, is concerned that the ATO, though good for long term-guidance, is
not flexible and responsive enough to accommodate the immediate collection
requirements that Army commanders face in combat. The Army is also
concerned about not having control ofUAV assets during operations. [Ref. 30:
p. 23] A collector tasking method is necessary that provides Army
commanders with a responsive collection capability during crises, but also
allows the JFACC to synchronize all air operations so as to maximize their
overall utility.
F. TASKING PROCEDURES
Chapter III describes in detail the procedure through which
intelligence requests are submitted up the chain of command and sent back
down to the operators for collection. According to Major Marshall, the
number of "wickets" in the intelligence cycle is one of the largest inhibitors to
tactical commanders getting the timely intelligence support they need on the
battlefield [Ref. 19: p. 63]. It may be possible to solve the problem through
"modification of the command and control process and
streamlining...reporting procedures" without expensive system modification
and hardware solutions [Ref. 31]. The goal of this thesis is to describe such a





Sometimes the best way to visualize how something is going to work is to
illustrate it by using an example. In order to understand how dynamic retasking
could work for the HAE UAV, an example will be used to describe how the tasking
could flow given a hypothetical example. This example scenario will help to
facilitate the realism of a possible NRT imagery requirement that an army
commander may experience on the battlefield. By following through the tasking
process for the following scenario, the reader will be able to assess how real is the
need for NRT imagery on the battlefield and how the HAE UAV might meet those
needs through a specific dynamic retasking procedure.
Given that dynamic retasking is assumed to be an exception to the rule and
not the normal operating procedure, the reader must understand that it would be
very difficult, if not impossible to describe the typical scenario in which the
commander on the battlefield finds himself in need of NRT imagery. This chapter
will attempt to describe a probable scenario in which an army commander requires
NRT imagery.
B. THEATER ASSUMPTIONS
We will assume that the conflict for this scenario is similar to the conflict
that occurred during Desert Storm. This implies that there is a single theater of
operations. This means that the HAE UAVs that have been attached to support
this conflict are only responsible for activity within the theater. Consequently, it is
assumed that no HAE UAV tasking from outside the theater CINC's area of
responsibility will be accepted, unless it supports the CINC's objectives. We will
also assume that the theater CINC is in control of the operations and he also acts as
the JTF commander. For purposes of this example, assume that the theater CINC
has designated a JFACC and that other important joint staff members, such as the
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J-2 and J-3, are in place in the theater and are acting in accordance with joint
doctrine stipulated in the Joint Pubs 2.0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to
Operations, 3-55 Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Target Acquisition Support,
and 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.
In accordance with the HAE UAV CONOPS, all HAE UAV assets will be
operated by ACC under the direction of the theater CINC [Ref. 12]. This CINC will
accomplish this by issuing guidance to the JFACC and the joint staff concerning the
CINC's EEIs and air apportionment decisions. The specifics of the CINC's
guidance is described more thoroughly in Joint Pubs 2.0 and 3-56.1
1. Collection Management Responsibilities
The J-2 will act as the collection manager for the theater and he will observe
all of the responsibilities assigned to him in accordance with the joint publications.
Chapter III above gives the details concerning his responsibilities as well as the
responsibilities of the JFC and other joint staff members. See Joint Pub 2.0 for
more details.
We will assume that the tasking process described in Chapter III will be in
effect, and that for dynamic retasking, a slightly altered procedure will be required.
This procedure will be discussed in detail in the Chapter VI.
2. Basing Considerations
According to the CONOPS, the HAE UAV detachment will have the
capability of being forward based or based behind the theater of operations [Ref.
12]. Because of the HAE UAVs long range capabilities, it will be able to operate
from this distance allowing valuable and possibly scarce ramp space to be used for
vital attack aircraft, such as fighters. If space is available, it is conceivable that the
HAE UAV detachment could be based within the theater of operations. The
optimum basing alternative may vary depending on factors such as the available
ramp space and support available. For this scenario, the assumption will be made
that the HAE UAV detachment is based behind the immediate theater of
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operations. We will arbitrarily assume a distance of at least 1000 NM from the
theater.
3. Communications and Supporting Tools
Communications links are assumed to be established and in place. This
implies that the theater J-2 will be using the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support
System (JDISS) to support intelligence-related planning and operations. We will
also assume that JDISS is available to the various service components and that
corp and division intelligence personnel have access to JDISS as well. JCMT will
also be available on JDISS so that the division level of command will be able to
utilize the JCMT current and planned capabilities described in Chapter III above.
We will assume that connectivity exists between all JCMT users. For our example,
JCMT users will include the division, corp, land component, J-2, J-3, JFACC, and
HAE UAV operators. We will also assume that voice connectivity is available
among these entities through the standard command, control, and communication
hierarchy.
C. TASKING SCENARIO
For our example, a need for NRT imagery will be realized at the division
level of command within the United States Army. An advancing Army division is
moving forward when its forward element "unexpectedly" begins to take indirect
fire from over a range of hills. The division needs "eyes" on the other side of the hill
immediately for targeting purposes and situational awareness. The risk to the
mission and human life is high, so the priority for imagery support is also high.
The division is not able to see over the hill for a number of reasons. Bad
weather disqualifies the use of certain collectors, and organic collectors are not
available with sufficient range. Consequently, the division commander's options
are limited. He is forced to consider requesting support from non-organic collectors
as his only means of collection.
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The commander decides that for this situation he needs a "big picture" view
of the battlefield. He wants to be able to see his own forces as well as the enemy
forces that are engaging him. He would also like to have imagery intelligence
immediately to support his own counterattack, to minimize casualties among his
troops and to reduce other losses to his force. The commander inquires of his
intelligence officers and other staff for support and so the collection management
process begins.
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VI. PROCESS FOR DYNAMIC RETASKING
A. INTRODUCTION
The process for dynamic retasking involves many entities. In order to
maximize the effectiveness of the dynamic retasking process, active participation by
the JFC and J-2 staff will be necessary. Their involvement and support of dynamic
collection requirements is essential to support the timely fulfillment of such
requirements. In addition, a standard procedure must be in place that will
facilitate the timely processing of real-time collection requirements. A procedure
must be in place that will ultimately connect the requester of collection support to
the actual collector operator. This chapter will describe the anticipated
responsibilities of the JFC and J-2 as well as provide the structure and definition
for a procedure that may facilitate the timely fulfillment of real-time requirements
given the assumptions made in Chapter V.
B. JOINT FORCE COMMANDER'S ROLE
The responsibility for the effective dynamic retasking of the HAE UAV begins
with the theater CINC or his designated Joint Force Commander. According to
Joint Pub 2.0, the JFC's guidance and directives will determine the way in which
the intelligence system operates during the type of conflict described in Chapter V.
Intelligence requirements are identified based on the JFC's guidance and
direction, estimate of the situation and objectives. The commander's
requirements must be the principal driver of intelligence system components,
organization, services, and products. [Joint Pub 2.0]
Since the JFC carries the responsibility of being the principal driver of the
intelligence system, he has the authority to provide guidance which may determine
the success or failure of dynamic intelligence collection operations. For optimum
performance of the intelligence system to meet time-critical collection requirements,
the JFC may choose to provide guidance and procedures on how he wants the J-2 to
handle time-sensitive requirements. These directives need not be specific, but may
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only require that the JFC ensure that the J-2 and other pertinent staff know that
he gives the dynamic retasking collection missions a particular priority with
regards to other collection missions. The JFC may also choose to specify priorities
within the different types of time-critical intelligence collection missions that may
occur such as deep reconnaissance and surveillance versus short or medium range
activities. The JFC may prioritize geographical areas or regions that he considers
more important to support if competing intelligence or collection requirements are
in conflict for scarce resources. This may become important if certain areas of the
theater gain more strategic significance than other areas during a particular time
period.
Another step the JFC may take to improve dynamic retasking capabilities is
to provide apportionment guidance to the J-2, J-3, and JFACC as well as other staff
involved in Collection Requirements Management (CRM) and Collection Operations
Management (COM) activities. This apportionment guidance could provide such
information as a percentage of collection assets, such as the HAE UAV, to be
dedicated to dynamic retasking. The JFC may designate a certain percentage of the
HAE UAV attachment to be available for use when and if a time-critical
requirement is identified. It may be possible to employ all the HAE UAVs but to
earmark certain assets for redirection from their current missions in order to fulfill
time-critical collection requirements.
C. J-2 STAFF CONTINGENCY
Given that the J-2 receives support from the JFC as described previously, the
J-2 will be better prepared to meet the dynamic collection requirements common to
the battlefield. However, the responsibility still rests with the J-2 on how he will
specifically employ the intelligence system to meet the JFC's objectives.
Ultimately, satisfying these requirements [those identified by the JFC] will
depend on the ability of each J-2 and their intelligence staffs at all levels of
command to (1) employ joint force organic intelligence resources; (2) identify
and, when assigned, integrate additional intelligence resources such as the
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joint intelligence center (JIC); and (3) apply national intelligence capabilities.
[Joint Pub 2.0]
For the J-2 to be able to fulfill these responsibilities most effectively, it seems
appropriate that practice is in order. To ensure that the J-2 and his staff are
capable of performing these tasks, exercises should be conducted to include J-2 and
staff participation. It is also advisable to have intelligence personnel trained and
ready for crisis situations so as to avoid the deficiencies in collection management
expertise experienced during Desert Storm.
Desert Storm demonstrated that the speed of modern warfare dictates that
commanders receive timely and accurate information to support them in the
decision making process. Along with being timely and accurate, RSTA forces
must be survivable, reliable, suitable, and interoperable (connectivity). To
achieve these capabilities, they must be exercised during peacetime with the
goal of being able to operate within the commander's operational planning
cycle. [Joint Pub 3-55]
Joint Pub 3-55 emphasizes the need to rehearse during peacetime to ensure
that our full intelligence capability can be brought to bear during conflict. It will
also be important to have trained and experienced intelligence personnel available
to handle time sensitive requirements that exceed the normal tempo of modern
warfare. Personnel must be trained and experienced with procedures as well as be
able to effectively use the supporting tools available to them such as JCMT.
In order for the maximum amount of dynamic requirements to be met during
conflict, not only are personnel to be trained and experienced for normal wartime
operational tempo, but procedures for dynamic collection need to be established and
practiced as well. Joint Pub 3-55 states, "The collection architecture must be in
place and the procedures exercised during peacetime in order to implement a
collection plan effectively at the beginning of hostilities." Joint Pub 2.0 reiterates
this need for a collection architecture that is able to handle dynamic requirements
when it states, "Where there are immediate threats...the intelligence system may
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need structure and methodology to provide near-real-time information and/or
intelligence."
To summarize, the state of readiness of the personnel involved with real-time
collection management activities is extremely important. The procedures
themselves can not guarantee success. Trained and experienced personnel
combined with a streamlined real-time collection process will provide the best
framework for the successful fulfillment of dynamic collection requirements on the
battlefield.
D. TASKING PROCESS AND FLOW OF REQUIREMENTS
1. Initiating the Request For Information
The tasking process for collection begins with the requester. In our case, the
requester is the commander of an Army division confronted by an "unseen" enemy
on the battlefield. The first step that must take place involves the commander and
his staff. In accordance with the Army procedures outlined in AFM 34-2 Collection
Management and Synchronizations Planning, the division must go through the
steps of developing requirements, developing the collection plan, and tasking or
requesting collection. The time that it takes to complete these steps depends
largely on the experience of the commander and his staff and the circumstances
surrounding the requirement [Ref. 20]. However, if the division is equipped with
the appropriate support tools, then the time will likely be reduced.
The Joint Collection Management Tool (JCMT) is anticipated to offer this
kind of support. Planned JCMT capabilities include models of all RSTA platforms.
This should eventually include the HAE UAV, and for our example we will assume
that it does. This capability will allow the requester to examine the performance
characteristics and capabilities of various collectors and allow him to request
support from what he believes to be the most appropriate collector. JCMT will also
provide availability information to the requester which may influence his decision
to request support from a particular resource. In order to achieve the maximum
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response in a time critical situation, the intelligence staff should already be
experienced in using JCMT and other available intelligence support tools provided
by JDISS, and be aware of collection asset capabilities and availability. This will
reduce unnecessary research and decrease the time required to complete the first
three steps of collection management identified by AFM 34-2.
For our example, we will assume that the commander and staff have
completed their assessment of the situation and decide to request support from the
HAE UAV. Normally, the commander would submit his request to the next highest
level of command. This process is described in detail in Chapter III. Because of the
time factor of this scenario, the commander needs support immediately, and the
normal tasking process is not fast enough to meet his requirement. An altered
tasking mechanism is necessary for the commander to get what he needs.
Senior commanders should authorize skip-echelon direct intelligence support
when necessary to provide timely critical intelligence for operating forces
being constituted, in transit, or engaged...Command authorization of skip-
echelon intelligence support does not alleviate the requirement to provide the
same intelligence to intermediate commands through the chain of command
and to supporting commands and organizations. [Joint Pub 2.0]
Joint Pub 2.0 highlights this need for skip-echelon procedures when
disseminating intelligence products to units in need of time critical intelligence. It
is the author's opinion that similar skip-echelon procedures are necessary for
commanders when requesting collection support to meet time critical intelligence
requirements. It is essential, as with skip-echelon dissemination, that the chain-of-
command be kept informed of all skip-echelon requests for collection support.
Consequently, higher levels of command may review and question those skip-
echelon requests that seem inappropriate or unnecessary. Higher levels of
command may also deem it necessary to halt skip-echelon requests that may
interfere with other higher priority collection efforts. In other words, all skip-
echelon requests will be accepted unless higher level commands actively reject a






































JFACC-Joint Force Air Component Commander
JAOC-Joint Air Operations Center
Figure 6-1. Skip-echelon collection request procedure.
Given that skip-echelon procedures are in place, the division commander may
submit his request directly to a specified theater collection management authority
for time critical requirements. Figure 6-1 shows this authority as the J-2. This
communication will be possible via JCMT. Plans are for JCMT to provide
connectivity between all JCMT users. This communication will include a chatter
capability which allows JCMT users to write back and forth to one another in real
time. Voice communications will also be in place between all JCMT users. JCMT
will support all required tasking message formats so that the division commander
will be able to submit his collection request in a format that will be acceptable and
understandable to those JCMT users located within the specified collection
management authority for the theater. Tools such as JCMT should reduce the time
required to receive and process tasking and request messages, and eliminate the
manually written procedures required during Desert Storm. For the purposes of
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this thesis, the aforementioned collection authority for time critical collection
requests will be called the Dynamic Requirements Collection Management
Authority (DRCMA).
Since JCMT will support normal collection procedures and dynamic collection
requests, a distinction must be made between the two. Both normal and immediate
collection requests must be organized by the commander and submitted through the
appropriate channels. For dynamic collection requests, the requester will be able to
flag his request within JCMT so that it is routed directly to the DRCMA. Normal
and dynamic collection procedures will operate concurrently during conflict,
therefore it is the commander's responsibility to utilize skip-echelon procedures only
when necessary.
2. Dynamic Requirements Collection Management Authority
The normal tasking procedures for collection management stipulate that
requests will make their way up the chain of command and be passed from the
components (for our example the land component) to the J-2. The J-2 will
ordinarily receive all requests and perform the functions of CRM. Upon completion
of CRM, the J-2 will pass the collection requirements to the JRC of the J-3. The
JRC will carry out COM. Finally, the tasking is coordinated and directed by the
JFACC and executed by the operators. Even with skip-echelon procedures in place,
the request must still travel through the three separate entities of the J-2, JRC and
JFACC before reaching the operators. Consequently, this process may not be timely
enough to satisfy NRT requirements. The process above needs revision if the
dynamic retasking of collectors such as the HAE UAV is to be effective. This
process is appropriate for planning, but a more responsive process is required to
meet the time critical requirements that commanders may face on the battlefield.
In the author's opinion, one solution may be to create a single entity that can
perform all of the functions described in the process above. The DRCMA is the
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proposed name of the cell that could perform the functions of CRM, COM, and





























DRCMA - Dynamic Requirements Collection Management Authority
Figure 6-2. Dynamic Requirements Collection Management Authority tasking procedure.
For our scenario, the division commander determines that the HAE UAV is
the most appropriate collector to meet his requirement. He will submit the request
via JCMT. Voice or chatter communications may be utilized if necessary. JCMT is
planned to provide the necessary tasking message format and links between JCMT
users so that the message can be sent and received in real-time. At this point, the
tasking message will go directly to the DRCMA, however, higher levels of command,
such as the corp and component levels, will have the authority to review all
requests and reject requests deemed unnecessary. It is important to emphasize
that these higher levels of command give their consent to the request by offering no
response. This allows the tasking message to be sent in the least amount of time.
Once tasking messages are received by the DRCMA, they will automatically
be directed to the appropriate collector cell. Collector cells will perform CRM and
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COM activities for only one specific collector, such as the HAE UAV. The collector
cell will validate the time critical requirement and make decisions in line with the
JFC or theater CINC's objectives and guidance. The cell may reject the request if it
does not support the JFC's objectives. The cell may also reject the request if other
dynamic requests have a higher priority or may pass the request to a currently
unused resource. If the request is not appropriate for that collector, then the
collector cell may pass it to the most appropriate cell within the DRCMA. The
requester will be notified via JCMT if his request has been denied. It is critical that
requesters be notified of denied requests as soon as possible so that their request
may be submitted through the normal collection process. Figure 6-3 shows the













DRCMA - Dynamic Requirements Collection Management Authority
Figure 6-3. Dynamic Requirements Collection Management Authority structure.
Once CRM and COM have been performed for valid requests, then
coordination and direction will be done by the DRCMA control cell. The DRCMA
control cell will have the authority to task collectors, but will maintain an intimate
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relationship with the JFACC and the JAOC to ensure deconfliction and the proper
coordination necessary to achieve optimum air operations effectiveness.
Each collector cell will consist of personnel representing the J-2, JRC or J-3,
and the JFACC. J-2, J-3, and JFACC teams will perform their normal functions,
but as a unit with a higher degree of integration. The team will operate under
guidance given by JFC or theater CINC. J-2 personnel within the team will oversee
decisions regarding the acceptance of requests based on the JFC EEI's guidance and
priorities. His decision will also rest upon special guidance given by JFC concerning
dynamic collection requirements. The J-3 team component will be aware of asset
availability and will ensure with the J-2 element that his collector is the most
appropriate. The JFACC component will be aware of all air activity and ensure the
proper coordination and deconfliction takes place, then direction given to operators
through the control cell. Collector cells will be able to task collector operators, but
must ensure they have authority and permission from the control cell.
In the author's opinion, the DRCMA should be located close to the JAOC.
The close proximity of the DRCMA and JAOC will promote the intimate
relationship necessary to ensure deconfliction. This will also allow collection
operations to be performed in concert with all other air operations, including
planned collection operations and air combat operations to maximize overall air
operations effectiveness.
3. HAE UAV Operational Unit
Once the DRCMA has validated a dynamic requirement, then it may be sent
to the collector operators. The tasking may be sent by the collector cell to the actual
operators via JCMT. The collector cell will also have the capability to connect the
Army commander with the actual collector operators. Since operators will receive
tasking through JCMT, they will have connectivity with all other JCMT users
including the Army division commander in our example. Figure 6.4 shows this
requester/operator connection.
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This type of requester/operator communication may be useful if the HAE
UAV is sending imagery directly to the Army division. This will allow the Army
commander to provide the collector operators feedback to insure fulfillment of the
requirement. This communication link may also prove valuable if the original
requirement leads to other dynamic requirements. In this case, the requester may
be able to pass requirements directly to the operators, ensuring the most timely
tasking procedure possible. JCMT will have the capability to connect all JCMT
users and real-time communications could be accomplished in the chatter mode.





























DRCMA - Dynamic Requirements Collection Management Authority
Figure 6-4. Requester/Operator communications capability.
The tasking process described above provides a framework through which
tactical commanders may request immediate collection support. By incorporating
skip-echelon procedures and combining the functions of several entities into the
DRCMA, a process has been defined that may satisfy the dynamic collection
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requirements that field commanders may face on the battlefield. Table 6-1
compares the normal collection process with the dynamic collection process. The
elimination of steps in the normal collection process is expected to shorten and
simplify the normal tasking process giving it the potential to satisfy the time-
critical collection requirements that will likely be experienced during combat.
Table 6-1. Normal and Dynamic Tasking Processes.
NORMAL TASKING PROCESS DYNAMIC RETASKING PROCESS
1) Division develops requirements 1) Division develops requirements
2) Division develops collection plan 2) Division develops collection plan
3) Division tasks organic assets or requests
collection
3) Division submits skip-echelon request directly
to DRCMA
4) Request approved and forwarded by the corp
level of command
4) DRCMA performs COM, CRM, coordination,
deconfliction and tasking functions
- J-2 element performs CRM
- J-3 element performs COM
- JFACC element coordinates, deconflicts, and
tasks collectors
5) Request approved and forwarded by the
component level of command
5) Collector operators perform mission
6) J-2/JIC reviews, validates and prioritizes
collection requests
7) J-3/JRC matches requirements with collection
assets
8) JFACC coordinates all air operations to ensure
deconfliction
9) Tasking for collector operators provided
through the ATO
10) Collector operators perform mission
Table 6-1 shows that the normal tasking process involves ten distinct steps,
whereas the dynamic retasking process takes only five. If we assume that each step
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takes approximately the same amount of time, then we could safely say that the
dynamic process takes half as much time. From this vantage point then, it is clear
that the simplified process will require less time. However, it is probably an
unrealistic assumption that each step is equivalent in time since each step is
unique and involves dissimilar entities and procedures. It is difficult to predict the
exact time involved in each step as the inconsistent and unpredictable nature of
war makes it impossible to do so. The fog and friction of war introduce a great deal
of variability in the expected time values of each step. Major Marshall shows from
his research that conventional reconnaissance system timelines reflect this
variation. The data he cites reflects that the total time necessary to get intelligence
to decision makers is between 51 and 420 minutes. This time includes the activites
of intelligence processing, production, exploitation and dissemination, therefore, it
does not represent time values we would expect to see in the tasking portion alone.
[Ref. 19: p. 61]
Because of the difficulties associated with predicting the time involved in
each step, and the variability introduced by the fog and friction of war, it would be
most appropriate to test each of the normal and dynamic tasking processes to
determine a true picture of the time involved. Several tests could be performed for
this purpose. The most basic method might be to create and run a computer
simulation that would compare the two tasking processes. Another option may be
to practice both tasking processes during military exercises using real intelligence
personnel and equipment. Another option may be to create a test unit that could
perform the functions of the dynamic retasking process in a simulated environment





The process described above may work well under some conditions, but it will
undoubtedly encounter problems given demanding circumstances. It must be
remembered that this process was developed based on the premise that dynamic
retasking for collection would be the exception to the rule and not the norm. Under
these kinds of circumstances where the number of real-time requirements
generated is a small percentage of all collection requirements, the process will likely
be effective. However, if the number of real-time requirements grows to an
excessive amount, then the effectiveness of the DRCMA may decrease significantly
as requirements exceed collection resources.
It is possible that as commanders use the DRCMA process for rapid collection
and find that it satisfies their needs, they will likely use it to meet more and more
of their requirements. This tendency will require that higher echelon commanders
monitor requests more diligently to insure that tasking requirements are valid for
the DRCMA process. If dynamic collection requests become too numerous, then the
DRCMA process will become bogged down, and consequently satisfy fewer and
fewer time-critical requirements.
As the number of collection requests grows, it is also possible that the
DRCMA mechanism will become a bottleneck in the process. One way to combat
bottlenecking may be to increase the number of collector cells and delineate tasking
authority directly to the cells. The cells could be divided in at least two, and
possibly more, ways to reduce bottlenecking in the process, as shown in Figure 6-5.
The first option could be to divide cells into geographic operating areas and group
all of the distinct collector cells for a particular region together. These geographic
regions could be determined by the JFC. Another possibility may be to divide the
cells by mission. This would allow all the collector cells to be grouped by the
different types of collection missions. In both of these examples, the tasking
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authority could be delineated further to each collector cell within the geographic or
mission divisions. This would allow the collector cells to respond quickly to
dynamic requirements with minimal procedural steps within the DRCMA chain-of-
command. It must be noted, however, that such a delineation of tasking authority
will likely make coordination a more complex problem and may reduce overall
effectiveness of the entire collection effort of the air campaign. The tradeoff
between timeliness and effectiveness/efficiency must be realized and decisions made
as to which is more important. This problem will not go away easily as long as
there are unlimited requirements stacked against scarce collection resources. It
may be wise to vary the delineation of tasking authority within the DRCMA during
operations to meet changing JFC priorities concerning timeliness versus
effectiveness and efficiency.
As an example, the JFC may decide that timeliness is more important during
a particularly fast-paced phase of the conflict. In that case, tasking authority may
be delegated to the collector cells in the DRCMA to reduce the time required to
fulfill a requirement. If the situation in the theater changes, then the JFC may
choose to emphasize the overall effectiveness of the air campaign, and tasking
authority may then be moved back up the chain-of-command to the DRCMA control
cell. This action may decrease timeliness, but increase the level of coordination
required between the JAOC and the DRCMA. If the pace of combat slows, this
option may be more appropriate for the DRCMA activities.
75





































Figure 6-5. Geographic and Mission divisions within the DRCMA.
2. Requester Competency
The timeliness of the DRCMA process depends largely on the ability of the
requester to choose the most appropriate collection platform to meet his
requirement. If the collection request is not made for the best collector, then it will
require more time for the request to be routed to the most correct platform. This
represents a shift in methodology for intelligence personnel who are accustomed to
making decisions regarding the most appropriate collector for a mission. In the
DRCMA process, the collector cell team will ultimately make these decisions, but if
a change is necessary, then the time to satisfy a requirement will increase.
Consequently, it is imperative that intelligence personnel on the requesting side be
competent to choose the best collector for the particular collection request. JCMT
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will support the requester in making the best decision by providing a model of all
collectors available. JCMT will also provide information concerning the specific
capabilities and availability of each collector.
F. SUMMARY
The collection management process involves many entities and many steps
are required to fulfill a requirement. It will be difficult to satisfy dynamic
requirements given the normal collection process. Incorporating a process that will
meet the dynamic collection needs inherent to the modern battlefield begins with
JFC involvement and interest. He must provide the guidance and authority
necessary to support the process. The J-2 and his staff must be trained and
experienced with dynamic collection procedures before hostilities begin. The
current process for collection could be altered in several ways to ensure timely and
effective tasking of collection assets. Instituting skip-echelon procedures will
reduce the time normally required for requests to travel through the chain-of-
command. Combining the functions of the J-2, JRC, and the JFACC into a single
entity, called the DRCMA, will facilitate a more timely response to dynamic
collection requests. The DRCMA will also provide flexibility during combat by
delineating tasking authority to meet the JFC priorities with regard to timeliness
and overall effectiveness. This delineation of authority could be exercised through
geographical or mission area divisions within the DRCMA to increase timeliness
and reduce the possibility of bottlenecking. The timeliness of the DRCMA process
also depends on the ability of requesters to select the most appropriate collector.
JCMT will support the requester's ability to make a wise selection by providing a






This thesis has attempted to describe the current intelligence system and the
methods through which that system processes real-time intelligence requirements.
The prohibitors to providing timely intelligence products through that intelligence
system to commanders on the battlefield have been discussed. The capabilities of
the HAE UAV have also been highlighted, and an attempt has been made to
describe a new process of satisfying real-time collection requirements that can
better exploit the new capabilities offered by the HAE UAV and reduce or eliminate
those factors which have prohibited timely collection in the past. This new process,
which utilizes a entity called the Dynamic Requirements Collection management
Authority (DRCMA), has the potential to reduce the time normally required for
battlefield commanders to get collection requests into the hands of collector
operators. However, two questions remain. Even if the DRCMA works perfectly,
will the entire shooter-to-sensor-to-shooter process be timely enough? Does the use of
the HAE UAV to meet battlefield commander's dynamic collection requirements make
sense? The following sections will provide the insight necessary to answer these
questions.
B. TIMELINESS
The tasking process described in Chapter VI has the potential to reduce the
time required for a battlefield commander to task a theater collection asset.
Assuming the tasking process works flawlessly, there are still issues that must be
resolved concerning the fusing and dissemination of the information that is
" collected. Traditionally, the exploitation and dissemination phase of the
intelligence cycle account for much of the time it takes to get usable intelligence to
the user. Taking this factor into consideration, the question arises if the total
intelligence cycle is timely enough to meet dynamic requirements even if the
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DRCMA process works perfectly. If the answer is likely not, then it may be wise to
focus more attention on the exploitation and dissemination phases of the cycle.
The present is marked by more and more defense budget cuts. In many
cases, the cost of a program is being forced to the forefront as the most important
factor in the acquisition process. In fact, the only firm requirement of the HAE UAV
program is to not exceed a unit flyaway price of $10 million [Ref. 12]. Even if the
HAE UAV was relatively inexpensive compared to current manned collectors, the
technology required to increase the timeliness of the exploitation and dissemination
phases may cost a great deal. Consequently, it may be more appropriate to consider
another approach to meeting battlefield commander's real-time intelligence needs.
Perhaps a cheaper and smaller UAV that provides ground commanders with an
organic collection capability would make more sense with regard to timeliness.
C. DEEP BATTLE CONSIDERATIONS
During Desert Storm, Army ground commanders complained about the air
support they received. Even though the theater CINC was an Army officer and the
Army deputy CINC was responsible for compiling the target list, ground
commanders were still not satisfied. The CINC did not always see things the same
way the Army ground commanders did at corps levels and below. [Ref. 32: p. 206-
209]
Traditionally, ground force commanders are preoccupied with the battle
directly in front of them and are less concerned with deeper and more strategic
threats. This limited view of the battlefield is attributed by some as the cause for
losses experienced at the fall of France in 1940 and the Kasserine in 1943.
AirLand Battle doctrine was created by the Army to correct this dangerously "near-
sighted" fixation. However, the problem clearly resurfaced during Desert Storm as
target requests coming up from the lowest levels of the ground forces reflected a
short-sighted perspective. [Ref. 32]
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Fortunately, General Schwarzkopf had the "big picture" in mind, but this
picture did not always support the ground force's targeting objectives. He realized
that targeting objectives should be prioritized based on theater objectives and not
on individual tactical needs. [Ref. 32] With this in mind, the Desert Storm
experience may affect the way the CINC or JFC chooses to allocate scarce collection
resources during a future conflict. If he has HAE UAVs available, he may choose to
use them to support theater objectives at the expense of tactical needs, such as a
ground commander's dynamic collection requirements.
D. RANGE CONSIDERATIONS
The near-sighted perspective demonstrated by ground forces during Desert
Storm must be considered in light of the HAE UAVs long range and long loiter time
capabilities. With a loiter time of 24 hours over a target 3000 NM from its
operating base, the HAE UAV must have a superb capability to see deep within
enemy territory for long periods of time. Figure 7-1 illustrates the capabilities of
the HAE UAV compared to other UAVs.
Real-time collection requirements that ground forces encounter are more
likely to be short range, as seen during Desert Storm. It is possible that ground
special forces elements may require deep intelligence collection support, but their
requirements will be few compared to those of the conventional ground force.
During conflict, the JFC may not want to utilize the valuable capabilities offered by
the HAE UAV to meet short range collection missions characteristic of dynamic
collection requirements of ground forces. Based on Figure 7-1, the JFC may choose
to use the HAE UAV for deeper reconnaissance and surveillance missions and use
other available collectors to satisfy short range requirements. Figure 7-1 also helps
to illustrate to dramatic difference in range capabilities between the various UAVs.
If the JFC is faced with apportioning air assets against battlefield commander's
real-time collection requirements, then it may make more sense to choose to use a
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shorter range collector such as the Predator and preserve the HAE UAV for more
demanding deeper reconnaissance missions.
HAE UAV Tier 2+
200 X 200 NM
Figure 7-1. Operating ranges of various UAVs. From Ref. [14].
E. CONCLUSIONS
The problems facing the warfighter today and tomorrow are significant.
Desert Storm demonstrated just how quickly the battle can progress and how
robust the intelligence system must be to meet such a demanding tempo on the
battlefield. Changes, revisions and advancements in the current intelligence
process are essential if US forces are to have the intelligence they need, when they
need it on the modern battlefield. The HAE UAV offers some needed capabilities,
and if used well, it has the potential to impact the quality of intelligence products.
However, the processes and procedures through which the HAE UAV may operate
must be transformed to support a higher operating tempo and dynamic
requirements inherent to combat.
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Current collection management procedures are not responsive enough to
meet the dynamic collection requirements inevitable on the battlefield. JFC
guidance, J-2 staff expertise, and skip-echelon procedures combined with the
Dynamic Retasking Collection Management Authority process have the potential to
reduce the time required for a battlefield commander to task the collector to meet
his specific requirements. JCMT may provide the essential communication between
the sensor and the shooter, and will also help the shooter to make better decisions
concerning collector selection.
To summarize, the DRCMA process requires six distinct things to happen
before it can work optimally. 1) The JFC must have confidence in the DRCMA
process and provide the necessary guidance to ensure that the DRCMA process
supports his priorities. 2) The command, control, and communication hierarchy
must be in place to allow for effective communication between all the entities
involved from lower level echelons (such as the division) to the DRCMA control and
collector cells, and collector operators. 3) JCMT must provide robust
communications between JCMT users, administrative tools, automatic request
routing to the appropriate collector cells, collector models and capability/availability
information. 4) An intimate working relationship must be established and
maintained between the DRCMA and JAOC to maximize the overall effectiveness of
air operations and to ensure deconfliction. 5) Battlefield commanders must be
trained and equipped to choose the most appropriate collector for their particular
dynamic requirements. 6) Smooth transitions must occur within the DRCMA
chain-of-command for the shifting delegation of tasking authority based on the
theater operating tempo and JFC guidance. The fulfillment of these six steps must
occur in order for the DRCMA process to work effectively. These steps are not
impossible, but will require a great deal of effort from all the entities involved in the
process. Once these steps have been fulfilled, the DRCMA process will have the
potential to streamline the tasking process, but changes in the exploitation and
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dissemination phases are still necessary to reduce the total time from shooter-to-
sensor-to-shooter.
Another factor to consider is the long range and long loiter time capabilities
of the HAE UAV. These capabilities may be more appropriately used to fulfill
deeper reconnaissance and surveillance missions to support the JFC's theater
objectives at the expense of close range dynamic collection needs experienced by
field commanders. The HAE UAV combined with the DRCMA process may offer a
quick solution to a complex problem, but a more serious look and perhaps a
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